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I.  INTRODUCTION: CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN’S RED HOT LAWSUIT 
The sole of each of his shoes is lacquered in a vivid, glossy red.  
The red soles offer the pleasure of secret knowledge to their wearer, 
and that of serendipity to their beholder.  Like Louis XIV’s red 
heels, they signal a sort of sumptuary code, promising a world of 
glamour and privilege.  They are also a marketing gimmick that 
renders an otherwise indistinguishable product instantly 
recognizable. 
- Lauren Collins on Christian Louboutin, March 20111 
Christian Louboutin redefined high-fashion footwear with his signature 
red sole.2  Nearly twenty years ago, the designer produced a collection of 
stilettos on which the visible soles were colored a shocking red.3  Since then, 
each and every one of his collections has featured this signature red sole.4  
The shoes quickly garnered an audience among the fashion elite, and now 
Louboutin’s name has become synonymous with luxury footwear.5  The 
shoes with the red soles have inspired pop music singles, museum 
retrospectives, and even articles in the New Yorker.6  Fashionistas around the 
 1.  Lauren Collins, Sole Mate: Christian Louboutin and the Psychology of Shoes, THE NEW 
YORKER, Mar. 28, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/03/28/110328fa_fact_collins?currentPage=1. 
 2.  See Alicia Waite, Christian Louboutin Retrospective to Open in London, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 
3, 2011, http://fashion.telegraph.co.uk/news-features/TMG8804599/Christian-Louboutin-
retrospective-to-open-in-London.html. 
 3.  See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Sometime around 1992 designer Christian Louboutin had a bright idea.  He began 
coloring glossy vivid red the outsoles of his high fashion women’s shoes.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 4.  See Collins, supra note 1, at 1 (“The sole of each of his shoes is lacquered in a vivid, glossy 
red.”). 
 5.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 447–48 (“Over the years, the high fashion industry 
responded.  Christian Louboutin’s bold divergence from the worn path paid its dividends.  Louboutin 
succeeded to the point where, in the high-stakes commercial markets and social circles in which 
these things matter a great deal, the red outsole became closely associated with Louboutin.”). 
 6.  See id. at 448 n.2 (quoting Jennifer Lopez’s single, “Louboutins”); see also Ella Alexander, 
Louboutin On Show, VOGUE, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.vogue.co.uk/news/2011/10/04/christian-
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world buy Louboutin’s shoes in droves, despite their prohibitory pricing.7  
And so it came as no surprise when Louboutin took the equally famous and 
fashionable designer Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) to court in August of 2011 
for stealing his look;8 after all, such a lucrative feature certainly required a 
level of jealous protection, and everyone who was anyone (in the world of 
haute couture footwear at least) knew that the red sole was Louboutin’s. 
What did come as a surprise was the judge’s ruling: it went against 
Louboutin.9  Indeed, the court not only denied Louboutin’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction against the sale of four different pairs of shoes from 
YSL’s Cruise 2011 collection—it also strongly suggested that Louboutin 
had no viable claim for trademark infringement in the first place.10  In 
concluding that Louboutin’s registered mark—known as the “Red Sole 
Mark”—should be invalidated, the court relied upon the complex and ill-
defined doctrine of aesthetic functionality.11 
Under this doctrine, a design feature merits trademark protection only if 
it can be shown to perform no significant function other than acting “as a 
symbol that distinguishes a firm’s goods and identifies their source.”12  The 
aesthetic functionality doctrine figures in trademark law as a sort of 
gatekeeper—its application is meant to advance competition in the United 
States marketplace by preventing any one entity from claiming exclusive 
ownership over design features that impact the cost, use, or purpose of 
commercial items.13  Though this policy goal is easy enough to recognize as 
legitimate, the conceptual and practical realities of the doctrine are much 
more convoluted.14  With the recent, widely publicized decision in the 
louboutin-retrospective-exhibition (“Christian Louboutin’s work . . . is set to become the subject of 
his first ever UK retrospective, starting in March next year at the Design Museum in London.”); 
Collins, supra note 1. 
 7.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 448.  A pair of Louboutin’s shoes currently retails for 
between $500 and $1500 dollars a pair.  See Cindy Clark, Christian Louboutin’s Red-Soled Shoes 
are Red-Hot, USA TODAY, Dec. 25, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/life/lifestyle/fashion/2007-12-
25-louboutin-shoes_N.htm. 
 8.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 450–51.  Louboutin brought claims for trademark 
infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act against competitor YSL with regard to 
four pairs of shoes in YSL’s collection that bore red soles as part of a monochromatic design.  See 
id. at 448. 
 9.  See id. at 449–50. 
 10.  See id. at 457. 
 11.  See id. at 453–55; see also infra Part II.B. 
 12.  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
 13.  See id. at 164. 
 14.  See infra Part III. 
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Louboutin case, however, the time has come to deconstruct the aesthetic 
functionality problem.15   
This Comment explores the aesthetic functionality doctrine, using the 
Louboutin case and the world of high-fashion footwear to illuminate the 
present legal and conceptual difficulties with its application.16  Part II 
provides an overview of the two legal arenas implicated by the Louboutin 
case and necessary to an understanding of the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine—the trademarking of color and the historical approaches to the 
functionality doctrine.17  Part III analyzes the current state of the law on 
aesthetic functionality, examining Supreme Court and circuit court 
precedent, and also closely reading the reasoning of the district court and the 
Second Circuit in the Louboutin case.18  Part IV examines this law through 
the lens of the high fashion industry and suggests that there are two plausible 
formulations of aesthetic functionality, one of which supports the district 
court’s holding in Louboutin where the other seems to contradict it.19  Part V 
argues that the aesthetic functionality formulation ultimately adopted by the 
federal courts will have serious repercussions for the concept of secondary 
meaning—one of the basic principles of trademark law.20  Part VI concludes 
that the superior formulation of aesthetic functionality would allow 
Louboutin to maintain his Red Sole Mark, giving fashionistas the 
opportunity to run their red soles to venues other than the courtroom.21 
II.  BACKGROUND: COLORMARKING AND QUANTUMS OF APPEAL 
The Louboutin case involves strands from two distinct legal arenas 
within the trademark field: the trademarking of color and the doctrine of 
aesthetic functionality.  Though these two issues intersect in a meaningful 
way in Louboutin, it is helpful to understand their separate developments. 
A.  The Trademarking of Color 
Nearly thirty years ago, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., the 
Supreme Court explicitly allowed for the trademarking of a single color 
applied to a consumer product.22  Prior to this decision, traditional trademark 
 15.  See infra Part IV. 
 16.  See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 17.  See infra Part II. 
 18.  See infra Part III. 
 19.  See infra Part IV. 
 20.  See infra Part V. 
 21.  See infra Part VI. 
 22.  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). 
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principles had held that color alone could not be validly trademarked.23  In 
the years leading up to the decision, the circuits had split on the issue, with 
the Federal Circuit allowing color to be trademarked under limited 
circumstances and the Seventh Circuit maintaining a total prohibition on the 
trademarking of color.24  In Qualitex, the Court addressed the specific 
 23.  See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:40 (4th ed. 
2011).  The Federal Circuit was the first to recognize that color alone could be validly trademarked 
in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  In its recognition 
that “there is no inherent bar to trademark registration of the color of goods [where] color is an 
overall color rather than in the form of a design,” the court noted that allowing the trademarking of 
color was “in harmony with modern trademark theory and jurisprudence.”  Id. at 1118.  The basis for 
this reasoning was the passage of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2006) 
(Lanham Act), which represented a Congressional “modernization of trademark law” that defined a 
“trademark” as “any word, name, symbol, or device . . . adopted and used by a manufacturer or 
merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others,” and 
thus did not, by its terms, demand the conclusion that color alone could not be trademarked.  In re 
Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (supplying an updated 
definition by stating that “the term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device . . . used 
by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by 
others and to indicate the source of the goods”).  As a controlling statute, the Lanham Act now 
represents the starting point for trademark analysis.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. 
  However, the notion that color alone could not be validly marked persisted for at least forty 
years after the passage of the Lanham Act.  See id. at 170–71 (noting the respondent’s argument that 
color should be denied trademark protection as a per se rule because pre-Lanham Act precedent had 
so held).  This is perhaps partly because the notion was not so much a per se rule as an expression of 
underlying concerns regarding effective competition.  See MCCARTHY, supra, § 7:40 (explaining the 
“color depletion” rationale).  But cf. In re Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1129 (Bissell, J., dissenting) 
(citing the 1984 edition of McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition for the proposition 
that: “A color, per se, is not capable of appropriation as a trademark.”).  Indeed, both before and 
after the passage of the Act, courts repeatedly expressed the concern that allowing single colors to be 
marked would result in “color depletion” and “color monopoly.”  See Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour 
& Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1949) (explaining that Campbell could not establish a mark in 
red-and-white soup labels because “the list of colors will soon run out” if such monopolization of 
them were allowed); Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727, 729 (6th Cir. 1906) 
(asserting that “the primary colors . . . are but few,” and “if two of these colors can be appropriated 
for one brand . . . it will not take long to appropriate the rest”). 
 24.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 161.  In In re Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123, the Federal 
Circuit allowed a company to trademark the pink color of its fiberglass insulation where the color 
was shown to perform “no non-trademark function” and where recognizing the mark was “consistent 
with the commercial and public purposes of trademarks.”  Conversely, in NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt 
Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1026 (7th Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of the dissent 
from In re Owens-Corning and suggested that a total ban on the trademarking of color should be 
maintained. 
  Interestingly, in NutraSweet, the court did not draw upon the oft-cited “color depletion” 
rationale, but rather referenced the problem of “shade confusion.”  Id. at 1027.  Under this argument, 
allowing a mark in one particular shade of a given color amounts to poor public policy because it 
creates difficulties regarding how many shade variations a valid mark might preclude competitors 
from using.  Id. (noting that “infringement actions could soon degenerate into questions of shade 
confusion,” with litigation being the only way to determine just “[h]ow different” the colors needed 
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question of whether or not Qualitex Company could hold a valid trademark 
in the green-gold color of the dry cleaning pads that it produced.25  The 
Court framed the issue as whether the Lanham Act permitted the registration 
of a trademark consisting, “purely and simply,” of a color.26  It then divided 
its analysis of the issue into two related determinations: (1) whether the 
explicit language of the Lanham Act prohibited the trademarking of color 
and (2) whether the “underlying principles of trademark law” supported the 
trademarking of color.27  The Court answered the first question summarily, 
noting that the Lanham Act defined a trademark to include “any word, name, 
symbol, or device,”28 and concluding that a color, as something “capable of 
carrying meaning,” could qualify as a symbol.29  In analyzing the second 
question, the Court came to two important conclusions.  First, it suggested 
that source identification was one of the most important principles of 
trademark law and found that color, if successfully presented in connection 
with a certain seller for a long enough period of time, could serve as a source 
identifier—a process the Court referred to as “[developing] secondary 
meaning.”30  This was important because one of the underlying principles 
to be, where NutraSweet claimed that Stadt Corporation was packaging its sugar substitute in 
confusingly similar blue pastel packets, but admitted that the exact shade of blue was not the same); 
see also MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 7:40 (identifying and explaining the “shade confusion” 
rationale). 
 25.  Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 161.  At the time, Qualitex Company had already acquired a trademark 
from the Patent and Trademark Office, which it used as the basis for a trademark infringement claim 
against Jacobson Products.  See id. 
 26.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit had set aside a district court ruling in favor of Qualitex on the 
trademark infringement claim on the grounds that “color alone cannot form the basis for a 
trademark.”  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d, 514 
U.S. 159 (1995).  The Court stated that the majority of Circuits maintained this rule and referenced 
both the “color depletion” rationale as well as the “shade confusion” issue raised in NutraSweet.  See 
id.; supra notes 23–24. 
 27.  Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. 
 28.  Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 29.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. 
 30.  Id. at 162–63.  The term “secondary meaning” is widely used in trademark law.  See Ingrida 
Karins Berzins, The Emerging Circuit Split Over Secondary Meaning In Trade Dress Law, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1661, 1662 (2004).  Secondary meaning exists where “the article itself . . . [is] so clearly 
identified with its source that its supply from any other source is clearly calculated to deceive the 
public and lead it to purchase the goods of one for that of another.”  Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. 
Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 1943).  Additionally, an article is 
said to have acquired secondary meaning if it prompts consumers to say: “That is the article I want 
because I know its source.”  Id.  The establishment of secondary meaning is not necessary for all 
valid marks, but applies only where the mark is not inherently distinctive.  See 3 CALLMANN, 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 20:27 (4th ed. 2011); see also Kookaï, 
S.A. v. Shabo, 950 F. Supp. 605, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Proof that a particular mark . . . has a 
‘secondary meaning’ associated with a particular product is not necessary when the mark in question 
is arbitrary or fanciful.”). 
  In Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162–63, the Court noted that color was capable of acquiring 
secondary meaning, although not inherently distinctive: “True, a product’s color is unlike ‘fanciful,’ 
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animating trademark law is the avoidance of customer confusion,31 and the 
ability of color to become so connected with a product or design feature as 
to identify it with a particular source meant that color could be validly 
trademarked without jeopardizing this important policy goal.32  The Court 
ultimately concluded that because color could acquire secondary meaning, 
the consumer confusion-source identification principle of trademark law did 
not militate a per se rule against the trademarking of color.33  Second, the 
Court suggested that the functionality doctrine of trademark law, which 
prevents the trademark system from inhibiting worthwhile competition, did 
not stand in the way of trademarking color alone.34  Noting that functionality 
exists where a design feature “is essential to the use or purpose of the 
article” or “affects the cost or quality of the article,” the Court concluded 
that color need not always be functional,35 and thus that the fundamental 
‘arbitrary,’ or ‘suggestive’ words or designs, which . . . automatically tell a customer that they refer 
to a brand . . . [b]ut, over time, customers may come to treat a particular color on a product or its 
packaging . . . as signifying a brand.” (internal citations omitted).  In the five years between the 
Qualitex ruling and the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 
212 (2000), lower courts were confused as to whether or not a color could qualify for trademark 
protection by being inherently distinctive.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 7:45.  This confusion 
was created by the Court’s somewhat ambiguous observation that “[w]e cannot find in the basic 
objectives of trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a 
trademark, where that color has attained ‘secondary meaning.’”  Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163.  Clearly, 
the confusion was warranted, as the Court neither clearly stated that color had to acquire secondary 
meaning nor entirely foreclosed the possibility of color being inherently distinctive.  See id.  
However, the Court eventually clarified its intention in Wal-Mart, where it stated that color marks 
can never be inherently distinctive.  Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 211 (“[W]ith respect to at least one 
category of marks—colors—we have held that no mark can ever be inherently distinctive.”). 
 31.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 2:2 (“Trademark law serves to protect . . . consumers from 
deception and confusion over trade symbols.”). 
 32.  See generally Diane E. Moir, Trademark Protection of Color Alone: How and When Does a 
Color Develop Secondary Meaning and Why Color Marks Can Never Be Inherently Distinctive, 27 
TOURO L. REV. 407 (2011) (recognizing that color can develop secondary meaning). 
 33.  Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164 (“It is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark—not its 
ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign—that permits it to serve [the basic 
purpose of preventing customer confusion].”). 
 34.  Id. at 164–65.  As noted by the Court in Qualitex, the functionality doctrine is an important 
characteristic distinguishing trademark protection from patent protection.  Id.  Because trademarks 
can potentially last forever, while patents are granted for only a certain amount of time out of a 
policy aim of rewarding invention, trademark law must be construed so as not to encompass those 
useful attributes of a product that provide an important functional benefit.  See id. (“It is the province 
of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new 
product designs or functions for a limited time.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (granting patents 
for a term of twenty years). 
 35.  Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165.  The Restatement Third of Unfair Competition labels a design or 
product feature as “functional” if it 
affords benefits in the manufacturing, marketing, or use of the goods or services with 
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trademark principle of insulating competition from the monopolization of 
important product features did not require a per se rule against trademarking 
color.36  Applying these legal insights to the facts of the specific case at 
hand, the Court concluded that Qualitex Company could maintain a valid 
trademark in the green-gold color of its dry cleaning pads because the color 
(1) had acquired secondary meaning since customers associated it with 
Qualitex and (2) was non-functional in the sense that it served no function 
other than to identify the pads as Qualitex’s.37 
Qualitex thus overturned the traditional rule against allowing color alone 
to be trademarked.38  The decision’s impact, however, is circumscribed by 
the Court’s reasoning: color alone cannot be trademarked under all 
circumstances, but only where it has obtained secondary meaning in the 
marketplace and is non-functional.39  In the fashion industry, these two 
prerequisites can send legal analysis in opposing directions, creating a 
unique difficulty for designers like Christian Louboutin.40  This is especially 
the case because fashion typically implicates the complicated doctrine of 
which the design is used, apart from any benefits attributable to the design’s significance 
as an indication of source, that are important to effective competition by others and that 
are not practically available through the use of alternative designs. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (2011).  This definition rejects one 
formulation of the aesthetic functionality doctrine.  See infra notes 53–90 and accompanying text. 
 36.  Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165. 
 37.  Id. at 166.  Importantly, the Court made its specific functionality conclusion with reference 
to the lack of any competitive need in the dry cleaning pad industry for color.  Id.  This conclusion 
represented the adoption of an express finding of the district court, which had originally found for 
Qualitex on the trademark infringement claim: “Although it is important to use some color on press 
pads to avoid noticeable stains, the court found ‘no competitive need in the press pad industry for the 
green-gold color, since other colors are equally usable.’”  Id. (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Prods. Co., No. 90-CV-1183, 1991 WL 318798, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1991)). 
  The Respondent in the case argued otherwise, suggesting that color was particularly 
important in the dry cleaning pad industry because the pads were routinely scorched during use and 
were “rendered unsightly if color [was] not present to mute or disguise the inevitable scorch marks.”  
Brief for Appellee in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159 
(1995) (No. 93-1577).  Though it appeared to concede that Qualitex Company was the only 
manufacturer who had used the green-gold color, the Respondent argued that color was important in 
the industry since a “white or uncolored” dry cleaning pad would not be saleable.  Id.  It also 
asserted that the district court had found that there was “a competive [sic] need for color in the 
manufacture of press pads”—the exact opposite of what the Supreme Court stated.  Id. at 11–12. 
  This fundamental disagreement about what constitutes a competitive need turns out to be a 
very important point of contention where the fashion industry is concerned, especially considering 
the Court’s later statement that the application of the aesthetic functionality doctrine to the 
trademarking of color ultimately turns upon a determination of whether trademark rights would 
“significantly hinder competition” in the industry.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170; see also infra Parts 
IV–V. 
 38.  See generally Elizabeth A. Overkamp, The Qualitex Monster: The Color Trademark 
Disaster, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 595, 595 (1995) (characterizing the Qualitex decision as an 
abandonment of the “traditional rule of no protection for color alone”). 
 39.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166. 
 40.  See infra Part IV.A. 
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aesthetic functionality, a particular permutation of the functionality 
doctrine.41 
B.  Aesthetic Functionality 
Aesthetic functionality is best conceived as a subcategory of the 
functionality doctrine.42  The functionality doctrine is a legal mechanism that 
serves to insulate from trademark protection those useful features that, if 
exclusively owned, might allow a single manufacturer to gain a monopoly 
over an entire industry.43  Aesthetic functionality represents one permutation 
of this doctrine and stands for the notion that certain design features may be 
competitively valuable—and thus ineligible for trademark protection—
because of their particular ability to generate consumer appeal.44  Such 
 41.  Strictly speaking, the fashion industry is fueled by ornamentation.  See Christian Louboutin 
S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent, Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).  To put it simply, consumers make fashion-purchasing 
decisions (at the most basic level) because they like the way that things look.  See id. (“[F]ashion 
embrace[s] matters of taste.”).  The doctrine of aesthetic functionality deals with this aspect of 
consumer behavior: those design features that perform some function in generating consumer 
appeal—that consumers like more than the alternative—may qualify as functional and thus render 
such designs beyond the realm of trademark protection.  See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 
7:79. 
 42.  The Restatement treats aesthetic functionality together with the more traditional notion of 
“utilitarian functionality.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (2011).  Broadly 
and simply defined, the doctrine of functionality stands for the proposition that a feature which 
contributes to the use of a product cannot be trademarked.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164–65.  See 
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. a (“The freedom to copy 
goods and services that have proven successful in the marketplace is fundamental to the operation of 
a competitive economy. . . .  [E]xcluding functional designs from the subject matter of trademark 
law is an attempt to identify situations in which the public and private interest in avoiding confusion 
is outweighed by the anticompetitive consequences of trademark protection.”).  Within this doctrine, 
there exists both “utilitarian” and “aesthetic” functionality.  See Tywanda Lord, Aesthetic 
Functionality on the Retreat, 169 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 29 (2007).  Utilitarian functionality, the 
“most widely accepted theory,” deems a feature functional if “it is essential to the use or purpose of 
the associated goods . . . or if it creates efficiencies in their manufacture or provision.”  Id. at 29. 
  Aesthetic functionality, on the other hand, operates where even though a design feature does 
not appear functional in the utilitarian sense, public policy considerations still weigh against granting 
trademark rights in it because the monopolization of it would hinder competition in the industry.  See 
MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 7:79; see also Mitchell M. Wong, The Aesthetic Functionality 
Doctrine and The Law of Trade-Dress Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1152–55 (1998) 
(asserting that “[t]he aesthetic functionality problem asks whether a design that is intrinsically 
attractive may receive trademark protection . . . focus[ing] on ornamental features that have the 
potential to influence consumer behavior, but are neither essential nor helpful to the primary 
function of the product”). 
 43.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164. 
 44.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (“When aesthetic 
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features are not functional in the traditional sense: they do not make 
products more useful, more efficient, or better adapted to the 
accomplishment of the particular tasks for which they are designed.45  They 
are, however, functional in a competitive sense: they possess a unique ability 
to attract consumers that is separate from any association with a particular 
source.46  That such features should be denied trademark protection where 
their exclusive use would foster monopolization is clear—indeed, the fact 
that aesthetic functionality is a subcategory of the broader functionality 
doctrine demands such a conclusion.47  However, the doctrine of aesthetic 
functionality is both more complex and less widely accepted than traditional 
functionality.48  Put simply, aesthetic functionality presents two major 
practical quandaries: the circumstances under which it exists are difficult to 
identify49 and the exact quantum of functionality that must exist in order to 
considerations play an important role in the purchasing decisions of prospective consumers, a design 
feature that substantially contributes to the aesthetic appeal of a product may qualify as 
‘functional.’”). 
 45.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 46.  The paradigmatic example of aesthetic functionality is the heart-shaped candy box.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, illus. 8.  The design feature with aesthetic 
functionality here is the heart shape of the box.  Id.  Where the heart shape is “an important factor in 
the appeal of the product,” it has a quantum of functionality that is both divorced from source-
identification and important to effective market competition.  Id.  Thus, the heart-shaped box is 
aesthetically functional and, consequently, does not qualify for trademark protection.  Id. 
 47.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170 (citing the functionality doctrine as a way of ensuring that the 
trademarking of color does not undermine the principles of trademark law by allowing some 
producers to gain competitive advantage since, by applying it, “courts . . . examine whether [color’s] 
use as a mark would permit one competitor . . . to interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-related) 
competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an important product ingredient”). 
 48.  At least three federal circuits—the Third, Fifth, and Federal Circuits—have refused to adopt 
the aesthetic functionality doctrine.  See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 538 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (rejecting the notion that “[f]eatures [contributing] to the commercial success of a product 
are . . . functional”); Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(noting the Circuit’s rejection of the “notion that purely aesthetic features can in themselves 
confer . . . functionality”); Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 428 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(rejecting aesthetic functionality because the doctrine of functionality should not “insulate[] a second 
comer from liability for copying the first comer’s design whenever the second comer can merely cite 
marketing reasons to justify the copying”); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 
824–26 (3d Cir. 1981) (demanding that any aesthetic functionality determination be relevant only 
insofar as the design feature at issue is “related to the utilitarian function of the product”). 
  Other circuits have cabined the doctrine out of concern for a broad-sweeping exception that 
would have the perverse effect of depriving features of trademark protection simply because they 
were particularly appealing or successful.  See Lord, supra note 42.  This concern arises from the 
Ninth Circuit’s seminal Pagliero decision, wherein the court found aesthetic functionality because 
the design feature was “an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product.”  Pagliero 
v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).  This decision has been widely criticized.  
See infra Part II.B.1. 
 49.  The Restatement of Unfair Competition makes it clear that aesthetic functionality should not 
be read to imply that a manufacturer “forfeit[s] trademark rights simply because prospective 
purchasers find the design aesthetically pleasing.”  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c.  However, the policy underlying the doctrine, at least theoretically, seems 
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use the doctrine to disqualify a feature from trademark protection is elusive 
and infinitely variable.50  Because of these difficulties, the circuits have 
construed and applied aesthetic functionality in a variety of different ways.51  
The two most prominent approaches are those of the Second and Ninth 
Circuits.52 
to allow for this outcome where the consumers find the product or design aesthetically pleasing for a 
reason that is separate from source-identification.  See infra notes 61–62.  Indeed, the doctrine itself 
seems intended to capture those design features so effective at drawing consumer attention that 
conveying their exclusive use to one manufacturer would foster monopolization—at least where the 
attraction can be divorced from association with a source.  See infra notes 61–62.  The problem, of 
course, is that in many contexts it can be nearly impossible to locate the appeal of any given 
product—to divine exactly what it was that motivated consumer behavior.  See supra note 46 and 
accompanying text.  Such difficulties are at their apex in trade dress cases, where the appeal exists in 
the combination of multiple design features—the overall “feel” of a particular brand—that are much 
more intertwined with their source than a heart-shaped candy box is with the brand name 
emblazoned upon it.  See generally Amy B. Cohen, Following the Direction of TrafFix: Trade Dress 
Law and Functionality Revisited, 50 IDEA 593 (2010).  The Restatement definition attempts to 
handle such difficulties by construing aesthetic functionality as preventing the recognition of 
trademark rights only where the design feature at issue “confers a significant benefit that cannot 
practically be duplicated by the use of alternative designs.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c.  Whether or not such designs exist is, of course, a slippery determination 
in and of itself—and, thus, the Restatement ultimately uses competitive need as a trump card.  See 
id. 
The Supreme Court cited, adopted, and construed this definition in Qualitex.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. 
at 170.  See infra Part III.A for discussion of the peculiar Qualitex construal of aesthetic 
functionality. 
 50.  See Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[A] 
trademark is always functional in the sense that it helps to sell goods by identifying their 
manufacturer.”).  Of course, the design feature must be shown to have more of a function than 
source-identification to qualify as aesthetically functional; however, just how much more seems to 
vary depending upon the nature of the industry at issue, especially considering the fact that 
competitive need—”whether the recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder 
competition”—is the dispositive question.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170 (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c). 
 51.  Though the Supreme Court touched upon aesthetic functionality in Qualitex, its explicit 
holding in the case dealt with the viability of color marks.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162, 170–72.  
Thus, though the Court’s reasoning regarding color marks implicitly relied upon some interpretation 
of the functionality doctrine, its specific statements about the doctrine are, at bottom, only dicta.  See 
infra Part III.A.  It should be noted, however, that Justice Kennedy later called aesthetic 
functionality the “central question” of Qualitex.  See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 
532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001).  With no definitive statement from the Supreme Court regarding the 
doctrine, circuits have diverged.  See infra Part III.B. 
 52.  The approaches of the Second and Ninth Circuits qualify as the most prominent primarily 
because many of the federal circuit courts have rejected the doctrine and thus have not developed a 
discernible jurisprudence regarding the issue.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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1.  The Ninth Circuit: From Pagliero to Au-Tomotive Gold 
In 1952, the Ninth Circuit became the first court to deal with the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine.53  With Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., this 
Circuit construed the doctrine in a sweepingly broad manner, essentially 
erecting a barrier to trademark protection of any feature that played some 
role in the commercial success of a given product.54  In Pagliero, the court 
evaluated the question of whether or not the appellants’ copying of several 
of Wallace China Company’s (Wallace) distinctive flower patterns on its 
own chinaware amounted to unfair competition.55  Assuming that Wallace 
could establish secondary meaning in the floral designs, the court ultimately 
dismissed the validity of trademark rights on the basis of functionality: it 
construed “function” to imply any purpose “other than a trade-mark 
purpose” and concluded that “[i]f the particular feature is an important 
ingredient in the commercial success of the product, the interest in free 
competition permits its imitation.”56  The floral china patterns at issue in the 
case were functional in that the beauty of the designs created an aesthetic 
appeal attractive to consumers.57  This appeal was said to be separate from 
any that might inhere in source-identification, as it was the beauty of the 
designs that attracted purchasers, not the association of the designs with 
Wallace.58  Because the floral designs were functional in that they were 
aesthetically appealing to the consumer, Wallace could not claim exclusive 
use.59 
The Pagliero approach can be characterized by the nature of the 
decision’s resolution of the two practical difficulties with aesthetic 
functionality: it allowed for broad identification and a small quantum.60  In 
 53.  See CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 30, § 19:9 
 54.  198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952). 
 55.  Id. at 340.  Because Wallace did not own a registered mark, the court took up the question as 
a “naked claim of unfair competition” under the Lanham Act.  Id. at 341 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 56.  Id. at 343. 
 57.  Id. at 343–44 (“The attractiveness and eye-appeal of the design sells the china.”). 
 58.  Id. at 344.  Of course, that the court summarily passed over the secondary meaning analysis 
significantly complicates this conclusion.  Indeed, with no definitive finding as to whether or not 
secondary meaning existed, the functionality ruling appears to contain a judicial assumption that the 
primary consumer appeal of the chinaware existed in the beauty of the designs—and not in the 
association of the designs with Wallace.  See id. (“It seems clear that these designs are not merely 
indicia of source, so that one who copies them can have no real purpose other than to trade on his 
competitor’s reputation.”).  A similar judicial assumption was made by the district court in the 
Louboutin case.  See infra Part III.C.1.  The particular danger of these sorts of conclusions is that 
they tend to reflect the perspective of the judge—an individual who is, by nature, an industry 
outsider and thus perhaps somewhat unlikely to make accurate assumptions about consumer 
behavior. 
 59.  See Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 344. 
 60.  See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
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terms of identifying the circumstances under which aesthetic functionality 
might exist, the Pagliero court implicated such functionality wherever the 
design feature at issue played any role in the commercial success of the 
product.61  The quantum of functionality required for application of the 
doctrine was also very small: the court did little more than make the 
tautological observation that because the china had sold, it must have been 
attractive in some way.62  This combination amounted to a very broad 
construction of the aesthetic functionality doctrine—one from which the 
Circuit began to retreat several decades later.63 
 61.  See Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343.  Such a broad construction—not surprisingly—drew the 
aspersion of legal scholars and other circuits, particularly the Second Circuit, which created a 
competing construction that aligned with the Restatement Third’s position requiring demonstration 
of alternative designs.  See infra Part II.B.2; see also Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger 
Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 80–82 (2d Cir. 1990). 
  It is particularly the breadth of the Ninth Circuit’s construction that has inspired dissent, as it 
seemed to sweep in all successful design features and thus (ironically) to undermine the competitive 
principle that the doctrine was meant to insulate by disincentivizing the creation of new designs.  See 
Lord, supra note 42, at 29 (“Pagliero seemed to imply that the more successful a product . . . the 
more likely [it] would be found to be aesthetically functional.”).  Indeed, a close reading of the 
decision reveals an interesting and prescient argument similar to that made in favor of modern-day 
“fast fashion” houses, which knock off haute couture designs at a fraction of the price: 
[T]o imitate is to compete in this type of situation.  Of course, [Pagliero] can also 
compete by developing designs even more aesthetically satisfying, but the possibility that 
an alternative product might be developed has never been considered a barrier to 
permitting imitation competition. . . . The law encourages competition not only in 
creativeness but in economy of manufacture and distribution as well. 
Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 344. 
  Thus, the implication with which commentators took issue may not have been terribly far 
from the truth: Pagliero is plausibly read as asserting that successful designs, where not purely 
source-identifying, should not be insulated from the sort of “knock-off” competition that copies and 
sells for less.  See N. Elizabeth Mills, Intellectual Property Protection for Fashion Design: An 
Overview of Existing Law and a Look Toward Proposed Legislative Changes, 5 SHIDLER J. L. COM. 
& TECH. 24 (2009).  The justifying rationale of such a position is that “imitation competition” does 
not actually involve any consumer confusion: the knock-off customer most often buys the imitation 
good intentionally.  See Johanna Blakley, Lessons From Fashion’s Free Culture, TED.COM (Apr. 
2010), http://www.ted.com/talks/johanna_blakley_lessons_from_fashion_s_free_culture.html 
(discussing the “fast fashion” phenomenon). 
 62.  See Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343–44 (“The attractiveness and eye-appeal of the design sells the 
china.”).  This “quantum” observation, as used herein, acts as a proxy for the level of scrutiny with 
which the court examines the competitive need for the design feature within the industry.  See supra 
note 58 and accompanying text.  In this case, the quantum was small because the court essentially 
presumed that because the china had sold, it was attractive in some way beyond pure source-
identification.  See Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343. 
 63.  At least one commentator has characterized the Ninth Circuit’s aesthetic functionality 
jurisprudence as a “consistent retreat” from the Pagliero decision.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 
7:80; see also Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1069–70 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
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In Vuitton et Fils v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit dealt 
with whether an imitator’s copying of the popular Louis Vuitton initial-and-
fleur-de-lis pattern (“LV”) on its luggage amounted to trademark 
infringement.64  The district court, relying upon Pagliero, dismissed 
Vuitton’s claim on summary judgment.65  But the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
rejecting the notion that “any feature of a product which contributes to the 
consumer appeal and saleability of the product is, as a matter of law, a 
functional element of that product.”66  The court distinguished Pagliero on 
the grounds that it had dealt with an unfair competition claim, not a 
trademark claim;67 yet, the court seriously altered its aesthetic functionality 
construction by making an assumption almost diametrically opposed to that 
of Pagliero.68  Defining “functional” to connote only those features “which 
constitute the actual benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as 
distinguished from an assurance that a particular entity made . . . [the] 
product,”69 the court ultimately concluded that the initial-and-fleur-de-lis 
pattern was not functional since it was not beautiful or appealing beyond its 
identification of the luggage with Vuitton.70  In other words, it was not the 
 64.  644 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1981).  For those unfamiliar with the pattern, the lower court 
described it: “a repeating pattern of five designs including a derivation of the fleur-de-lis, the 
traditional insignia of French royalty, and initials, printed in mustard color on a brown background.”  
Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., No. 78-4834, 1980 WL 30280, ¶ I.5 (C.D. Cal. June 
10, 1980), rev’d, 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 65.  See Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 772. 
 66.  Id. at 773. 
 67.  Id.  The court noted that in Vuitton there was a registered trademark of the symbol “LV” and 
that no similar registered mark existed in Pagliero.  See id. at 773–74. 
 68.  Though Pagliero’s “important ingredient” language is reasonably read as sweeping in all 
design features that contribute to the commercial success of a product, the Ninth Circuit in Vuitton 
maintained that this had not been the case: it explicitly stated that Pagliero did not “impel such a 
conclusion.”  See Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 773. 
 69.  Id. at 774 (quoting Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 
(9th Cir. 1980)). 
 70.  Id.  Indeed, the court’s analysis reflects a serious shift in premise: where the Pagliero court 
had passed over the secondary meaning question and presumed that because the china had sold, the 
floral designs must have contained some attractive quality, the Vuitton court seemed to begin from 
the premise that the ability of the luggage to sell could be mainly attributed to the strength of the 
“LV” brand and required more proof that there was some appeal beyond this source-identification.  
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  Such variation might be explained with reference to the 
fact that Vuitton’s claim was buttressed by the existence of a strong, registered mark in the design.  
See Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 774–75.  Indeed, the court explicitly noted such a distinction, reciting the 
Lanham Act’s evidentiary principle that registration “shall be prima facie evidence of a registrant’s 
exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce.”  Id. at 774; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) 
(2006). 
  Though such a distinction is theoretically sound, it is practically problematic, since the only 
meaningful distinction between the designs at issue in the two cases is the presence of the branded 
initials in the Vuitton design.  See Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 774.  Thus, the distinction is useful for the 
particular facts of the case but less helpful beyond that.  It does not, for instance, provide any insight 
as to whether protection of the Vuitton design might exist where an imitation competitor copied the 
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beauty of the design that attracted customers (as had ostensibly been the case 
in Pagliero) but rather the prestige associated with the brand.71  This 
reformulation of aesthetic functionality can be characterized as limiting the 
doctrine’s identification aspect while expanding its quantum requirement.72  
In identifying the circumstances under which aesthetic functionality might 
bar trademark protection, the court backed away from Pagliero’s sweeping 
language by limiting the doctrine’s applicability to instances in which the 
design feature serves a purpose beyond that merely incidental to source-
identification.73  The quantum of functionality required for application of the 
doctrine was also extended: rather than treating commercial success as a 
virtual proxy for functionality, the court required affirmative demonstration 
that consumer appeal was generated by the specific design feature at issue.74  
This application of aesthetic functionality robbed the doctrine of much of its 
potential usefulness for imitators, and marked the beginning of a decline in 
its use within the Ninth Circuit.75  During the two decades following the 
Vuitton decision, the Ninth Circuit steadily backed away from any 
application—let alone an expansive one—of the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine.76  Finally, in 2006, the Circuit confronted the doctrine again, only 
to come full circle from its initial definition of the doctrine in Pagliero.77 
design but slightly altered the brand symbol by reversing the initials or changing them somehow. 
 71.  Id.  The court said that it was “not convinced that Vuitton’s design . . . is that aspect of its 
products which satisfies its consumers’ tastes for beauty” and noted that “[s]ince the products are 
largely carried on the person, a consumer’s interest in the prestige afforded by carrying a certain bag 
may overshadow that person’s sense for the purely aesthetic.”  Id. 
 72.  See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 73.  This reformulation might be best characterized as a strengthening of the secondary meaning 
analysis or, perhaps, as a transformation of the secondary meaning analysis into a threshold question.  
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  In other words, Vuitton is plausibly read as suggesting 
that where secondary meaning is established, the burden should shift to the party asserting aesthetic 
functionality to demonstrate that the design feature serves some function beyond source-
identification—or that its consumer appeal cannot or should not be attributed purely to the success of 
the branding.  See Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 774 (“[A] trademark which identifies the source of goods and 
incidentally serves another function may still be entitled to protection.”). 
 74.  See id. 
 75.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 7:80. 
 76.  See Yevgeniy Markov, Raising the Dead: How the Ninth Circuit Avoided the Supreme 
Court’s Guidelines Concerning Aesthetic Functionality and Still Got Away with It in Au-Tomotive 
Gold, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 197, 200 (2008) (observing that “[a]fter Vuitton, aesthetic 
functionality significantly faded in the Ninth Circuit over a period of several decades”).  It is 
interesting to note that the Ninth Circuit itself recognized during this time period that the doctrine 
was fading into disuse: in 1987, six years after the Vuitton decision, it stated that “the ‘aesthetic’ 
functionality test has been limited, if not rejected, in favor of the ‘utilitarian’ functionality test.”  
First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1382 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Fabrica, Inc. 
v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1983) (for the proposition that the aesthetic 
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In Au-Tomotive Gold, the Ninth Circuit dealt with Au-Tomotive Gold, 
Inc.’s (Auto Gold) unlicensed sale of key chains, license plates, and other 
automobile accessories bearing the unique insignia of Volkswagen and 
Audi.78  Auto Gold marshaled the doctrine of aesthetic functionality in its 
defense, suggesting that the insignia were functional in that they were the 
“actual benefit” that consumers wished to purchase.79  The district court 
ruled in Auto Gold’s favor, concluding that the insignia were functional, 
because consumers were primarily interested in the aesthetic appeal of the 
designs of the logos themselves and not in any reputation-related benefit 
associated with their source-identification.80  But the Ninth Circuit 
functionality test may have been rejected); Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 773 (for the proposition that the 
aesthetic functionality test has been limited)).  In 2001, the Ninth Circuit seemed not only to reject 
the doctrine as applied but also to question its internal conceptual legitimacy.  See Clicks Billiards, 
Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that features cannot be “both 
‘functional and purely aesthetic’” because such a notion is “internally inconsistent and at odds with 
the commonly accepted view that functionality denotes utility” and observing that “this circuit [has 
not] adopted the ‘aesthetic functionality’ theory, that is, the notion that a purely aesthetic feature can 
be functional”).  It should also be noted, however, that both of these cases addressed the doctrine of 
aesthetic functionality in the context of trade dress claims, and not with explicit reference to the 
trademarkability of unique design features.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., 
Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2006).  The difference is not particularly germane to the 
purposes of the analysis herein, as the salient point is the effect that the doctrine has on the potential 
for design features to gain intellectual property protection.  See id. (noting that the cases examined 
trade dress but not rejecting their precedential applicability). 
 77.  It is important to note that this case was decided in the wake of Qualitex.  See infra Part 
III.A.  Though it is somewhat unclear whether or not Qualitex’s aesthetic functionality analysis is 
binding precedent—as much of it appears to be discussed only incidentally to the ultimate holding 
with regard to trademarking color—the Ninth Circuit was at least required to grapple with the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the issue.  See Markov, supra note 76, at 205.  At least one 
commentator is of the opinion that “the entirety of the . . . Supreme Court case law relating to the 
doctrine of aesthetic functionality currently rests upon an incorrect interpretation of the Qualitex 
decision supported by dicta.”  Id. at 197.  For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
aesthetic functionality, see infra Part III.A. 
 78.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1064–65.  The court framed the question as “whether the 
Lanham Act prevents a maker of automobile accessories from selling, without a license or other 
authorization, products bearing exact replicas of the trademarks of these famous car companies.”  Id. 
at 1064. 
 79.  Id.  In doing so, Auto Gold was relying on precedent from Vuitton, wherein functionality 
was defined in just this way—as the “actual benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase.”  See 
supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 80.  Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1066.  In other words, the district court, using the definition 
of “functional” from Vuitton, see supra notes 71, 73, concluded that Auto Gold’s unlicensed use of 
the insignia was protected by the doctrine of aesthetic functionality, because purchasers were 
interested in buying accessories for the marks themselves—and not because of any assurance that the 
accessories were actually manufactured by Audi or Volkswagen.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d 
at 1066 (“[T]he VW and Audi logos are used not because they signify that the license plate or key 
ring was manufactured or sold . . . by Volkswagen . . . , but because there is an aesthetic quality to 
the marks that purchasers are interested in having.”). 
  There are two plausible and subtly distinct readings of this finding.  First, it is possible the 
court was suggesting that consumers were attracted by the particular way in which the insignia were 
designed; something about them looked attractive and was desirable, driving market behavior 
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overturned, rejecting Auto Gold’s interpretation of functionality and instead 
concluding that the doctrine should be applied only to those features serving 
an “aesthetic purpose wholly independent of any source-identifying 
function.”81  Because the court found “no evidence that consumers buy Auto 
separate from consumer association of the mark with Audi or Volkswagen.  See id.  This reading 
entails the presumption that there would have been a market for Auto Gold’s accessories even if 
Audi and Volkswagen did not exist—a supposition that is speculative on its face, and certainly 
difficult to maintain in light of Vuitton, wherein the court refused to apply aesthetic functionality to 
protect an imitator’s use of the distinctive “LV” insignia.  See Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 775.  Despite its 
practical unreality, this reading is legally sound: if the aesthetic appeal of the insignia could really be 
divorced from its source-identification, aesthetic functionality, under Vuitton, might apply.  See id.  
The more practical reading, unfortunately, lacks even that sort of tenuous legal underpinning.  This 
alternative reading rests on one specific permutation of Vuitton and suggests that the actual benefit 
consumers seek in purchasing the insignia is not the assurance that a particular entity made the 
product, but simply the possession of the mark itself.  See id.  This reading is akin to the suggestion 
that consumers really do not care whether their key chains are actually manufactured by Audi—they 
just want to have a keychain bearing the Audi mark.  In other words, they want the prestige 
associated with the brand, regardless of whether the particular item in question actually emanated 
from the prestigious source.  Though such a reading, as the circuit court ultimately suggested, see 
Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1064, is legally untenable, it is, in a practical sense, easy to grasp: the 
consumer who has just spent forty thousand dollars on an Audi A4 might begrudge to the approved 
dealership the fifty dollars for the keychain, especially when he can get a keychain bearing the Audi 
insignia at a much lower price from another source.  As this illustration suggests, it is not difficult to 
imagine a scenario in which the important consumer-confusion principle of trademark law is not at 
all implicated, see supra note 31, and where the use of the mark is functional in the sense that it is 
the actual benefit that the consumer wants to purchase.  Unfortunately, this sort of reading easily 
devolves into an inquiry about why consumers want to own items bearing particular marks.  If 
consumers simply desire the sort of aesthetic symmetry that comes with matching their keychain to 
their car, this might be said to be divorced from source-identification; however, if they want the 
mark in order to acquire the prestige associated with the brand, it becomes difficult to say that the 
mark is functional in a manner entirely separate from source-identification.  See MCCARTHY, supra 
note 23, § 7:80 (characterizing Auto Gold’s argument as an assertion of the aesthetic desire of the 
Volkswagen and Audi owners to match their accessories to their cars). 
  The internal conceptual difficulty with this second reading may derive from a tension 
between two of the basic goals of trademark law—prevention of consumer confusion and insulation 
of fair competition—somewhat unique to modern brand-driven consumption.  See id. §§ 1:1, 3:5; see 
also Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1067 (“Famous trademarks have assumed an exalted status of 
their own in today’s consumer culture that cannot neatly be reduced to the historic function of 
trademark to designate source.”).  Modern consumers seek to divorce prestige from emanation, 
rendering it quite difficult to divine the “actual benefit” that they hope to derive from the purchase of 
a particular good.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1067; see also Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 775.  The 
difficulty is particularly great in the fashion industry, which is increasingly driven by branding.  See 
generally Sara R. Ellis, Comment, Copyrighting Couture: An Examination of Fashion Design 
Protection and Why the DPPA and IDPPPA Are A Step Towards the Solution to Counterfeit Chic, 
78 TENN. L. REV. 163 (2010). 
 81.  Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1073. 
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Gold’s products solely because of their ‘intrinsic’ aesthetic appeal,” it 
refused to apply the doctrine.82 
This interpretation of aesthetic functionality completed the analytical 
movement begun in Vuitton: it implicated the doctrine only where the 
contested design feature could be affirmatively shown to perform a function 
completely and totally distinct from source-identification.83  This movement 
represents a narrowing of the identification aspect of aesthetic functionality: 
where the court in Pagliero had applied aesthetic functionality if the feature 
played any role in the commercial success of a product, and, in Vuitton, had 
limited its application to instances wherein the feature constituted some 
benefit that the consumer wished to purchase beyond pure association with a 
certain source, in Au-Tomotive Gold it refused to apply the doctrine unless 
the contested feature could be shown to serve a purpose completely and 
totally distinct from source-identification.84  Such a requirement significantly 
limits the instances in which aesthetic functionality will apply.85  
Additionally, the Au-Tomotive Gold formulation of aesthetic functionality 
imposes a large quantum—the design feature must not only generate appeal 
in addition to that already extant as a result of source-association, it must 
generate appeal independent of it.86  Practically, the requirement of an 
independent aesthetic purpose means that the design feature at issue must be 
 82.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 83.  See supra notes 70–71, 73.  In Vuitton, the court moved away from Pagliero by requiring 
not just that the product in question have commercial success, but also that the specific design 
feature at issue be shown to have been functional—to have generated consumer appeal—in its own 
right.  See Vuittion, 644 F.2d at 775–76.  Rather than assuming that the contested design feature was 
functional simply because the product was successful, Vuitton required some more specific showing.  
See id.  Moreover, it required that this demonstrated functionality be in some way distinct from 
source-identification; in other words, aesthetic functionality could only attach where the specific 
design feature at issue generated consumer appeal by offering something more than an assurance that 
the product in question emanated from a particular source.  See id.  In Au-Tomotive Gold, the court 
extended this requirement to its logical end by interpreting the doctrine to demand that the specific 
design feature generate consumer appeal separate and apart from any source-identification.  See 
supra note 80 and accompanying text.  Under the Au-Tomotive Gold formulation—unlike Vuitton—
it would not be enough to demonstrate that consumers were attracted both by the beauty of the 
design and by the design’s association with a prestigious brand.  See Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 774.  
Instead, to be successful in convincing a court to disqualify a feature from trademark protection 
under the doctrine of aesthetic functionality, a party would need to show that consumers were 
attracted solely by the independent function of the feature, whatever that might be.  See Au-Tomotive 
Gold, 457 F.3d at 1073. 
 84.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1073. 
 85.  In essence, it does so because it requires parties hoping to invoke the doctrine to divorce the 
alleged function of the design feature from branding.  See id.  This effectively requires such parties 
to bear the evidentiary burden with regard to consumer behavior, something that the court in Au-
Tomotive Gold explicitly recognized would be very difficult to do.  Id. (“This consumer demand is 
difficult to quarantine from the source-identification and reputation-enhancing value of the 
trademarks themselves.”).  See also supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussion of this burden-
shifting interpretation in the context of the Vuitton decision). 
 86.  Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1073–74. 
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aesthetically attractive or useful in its own right in some manner significant 
enough to qualify as necessary for effective competition in the 
marketplace.87 
Thus, in the nearly sixty years since the Pagliero decision, the Ninth 
Circuit has completed a jurisprudential one-eighty.88  Today, its approach 
can be broadly characterized as a circumscribed acceptance of the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine: though conceptually viable within the circuit, the 
doctrine has been interpreted such that it will only apply under very limited 
circumstances.89  Under this circuit’s approach, aesthetic functionality is 
characterized by a limited identification and a large quantum.90  The other 
prominent approach to the doctrine, that of the Second Circuit, collapses 
these two considerations—which lie at the core of the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine—into a single inquiry. 
2.  The Second Circuit: Duplication by the Use of Alternative Designs 
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit has also both adopted and 
cabined the doctrine of aesthetic functionality.91  However, unlike its sister 
 87.  In other words, the requirement of independent functionality means that the appeal of the 
feature must be so apparently divorced from any source-identifying function that no speculation of 
the sort performed by the district court in Au-Tomotive Gold is necessary.  See supra note 83 and 
accompanying text.  Practically, this means that the secondary meaning analysis will bear heavily on 
the viability of any aesthetic functionality claim: the more that any particular design feature is 
closely associated with a brand or manufacturer, the harder it will be to determine consumer 
motivation, and, unless the feature clearly has an independent function—something more likely to be 
the case where utilitarian functionality applies—the more difficult it will be to apply aesthetic 
functionality.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1070–73 (discussing the utilitarian functionality 
analysis as established by the Supreme Court in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 
532 U.S. 23 (2001)).  This can be seen from an examination of the Ninth Circuit’s support for its 
analysis: in noting that “aesthetic functionality has been [practically] limited to product features that 
serve an aesthetic purpose wholly independent of any source-identifying function,” the court cited 
three examples of features that would satisfy such a test—the color of dry-cleaning pads to hide 
visible stains, the coloring of the edges of pages in a cookbook to avoid the bleeding of color 
between pages, and the use of the color black on outboard boat engines to make the engines appear 
smaller.  See id. at 1073.  These sorts of purposes are, arguably, very close to actual utilitarian 
functionality in that their contribution to consumer appeal is concrete and relatively easy to quantify.  
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (dry cleaning pads); see also 
Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 342 (7th Cir. 1998) (colored edges of pages of 
cookbook); Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (outboard 
engine). 
 88.  See supra notes 53–87 and accompanying text. 
 89.  See supra note 83. 
 90.  See supra Part II.B. 
 91.  See supra Part II.B.1 and note 48. 
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circuit, this circuit redefined the doctrine to require a lack of available 
alternative designs: design features will only be disqualified from 
trademarkability on grounds of aesthetic functionality where there is a lack 
of alternative designs available to competitors in the industry.92  While the 
Ninth Circuit moved away from the potentially disastrous consequences of 
Pagliero by adjusting the identification and quantum factors in incremental 
fashion,93 the Second Circuit did so by collapsing these factors into a single 
examination—and forcing those hoping to take advantage of the doctrine to 
demonstrate that they cannot compete in the market without access to the 
design feature as currently in use.94  The development of this interpretation is 
reflected in several important cases. 
In Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 
the Circuit addressed the question of whether Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc. 
(Godinger) could market and sell silverware “inspired by,” and imitating, the 
style of a line manufactured and sold by Wallace International Silversmiths, 
Inc. (Wallace).95  Though the court ultimately found that the baroque design 
was aesthetically functional, it adamantly refused to adopt the Pagliero 
interpretation of aesthetic functionality.96  Concerned that acceptance of the 
 92.  See Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 78–82 (2d Cir. 
1990).  This is also the approach adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c 
A manufacturer . . . does not forfeit trademark rights simply because prospective 
purchasers find the design aesthetically pleasing.  A design is functional because of its 
aesthetic value only if it confers a . . . benefit that cannot be practically duplicated by the 
use of alternative designs.  Because of the difficulties inherent in evaluating the aesthetic 
superiority of a particular design, a finding of aesthetic functionality ordinarily will be 
made only when objective evidence indicates a lack of adequate alternative designs. 
Id. 
 93.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 94.  The Restatement notes that the demonstration of alternative designs will often be 
circumscribed according to the nature of the available evidence, meaning that aesthetic functionality 
will only apply—or even potentially apply—where “the range of alternative designs is limited either 
by the nature of the design feature or . . . the basis of its aesthetic appeal.”  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c.  The illustrations are particularly illuminating on this 
point: a heart-shaped box could not be viably trademarked under this interpretation of aesthetic 
functionality, because the heart-shape is the basis of the particular aesthetic appeal that is essential to 
competition in the market for selling Valentine’s Day candy, id. § 17 cmt. c, illus. 7; additionally, a 
design consisting of different colored stones on plates would also not qualify for trademark 
protection because the number of available design options is limited by the finite stone-color and -
placement options.  Id. illus. 8. 
 95.  916 F.2d at 77.  Wallace’s line was referred to as the “Grand Baroque” line and was 
patterned in a manner described as “ornate, massive and flowery [with] indented, flowery roots and 
scrolls and curls along the side of the shaft, and flower arrangements along the front of the shaft.”  
Id.  The imitation line produced by Godinger was similar in style but with significantly different 
dimensions.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 80 (rejecting the district court opinion’s reliance on the Pagliero precedent because 
“[t]hat decision allowed a competitor to sell exact copies of china bearing a particular pattern 
without finding that comparably attractive patterns were not available to the competitor”). 
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“important ingredient in the commercial success” language out of the Ninth 
Circuit would discourage originators “from developing pleasing designs,”97 
the court instead explicitly adopted the Restatement definition, refusing to 
afford trademark protection to Wallace on the grounds that the company 
sought to monopolize the basic elements of the baroque style—a maneuver 
that would dampen fair competition in the baroque silverware market.98  
Noting that “design features . . . that are necessary to [a] product’s utility 
may be copied by competitors under the functionality doctrine,” the court 
suggested that a demonstration of alternative designs struck the correct 
balance between protection of intellectual property and promotion of 
competition.99  In other words, because granting Wallace a trademark in the 
basic elements of the baroque style would “exclude competitors from 
producing similar products” in that there would be no baroque silverware 
design that was not protected under the mark, Wallace’s attempt at gaining 
trademark protection faltered on the doctrine of aesthetic functionality.100  
Wallace could not demonstrate that there were adequate alternative designs 
available by which other designers could compete in the baroque silverware 
industry,101 and, because of this, it was ultimately denied trademark 
protection.102 
 97.  Id.; see Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952); see also supra 
Part II.B.1. 
 98.  See Wallace, 916 F.2d at 81 (“Wallace may not exclude competitors from using those 
baroque design elements necessary to compete in the market for baroque silverware.”).  This 
justification embodies the Second Circuit approach in the sense that if Wallace had sought to 
trademark “a precise expression of [the] decorative style,” it probably would have been successful, 
because there would have been numerous other expressions that could have been created from the 
same basic elements.  See id.  Incidentally, but interestingly for the purposes of the topic of this 
Comment, the court in Wallace specifically observed that its approach to aesthetic functionality 
might very well operate to disqualify colormarking in some instances, stating that “[w]here granting 
trademark protection to the use of certain colors would tend to exclude competitors, such protection 
is . . . limited.”  Id. 
 99.  See id. at 81. 
[W]here an ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and trademark protection would 
significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of adequate alternative designs, the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine denies such protection.  This rule avoids the overbreadth 
of Pagliero by requiring a finding of foreclosure of alternatives while still ensuring that 
trademark protection does not exclude competitors from substantial markets. 
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17). 
 100.  Id. at 81–82. 
 101.  Wallace was seeking a preliminary injunction against Godinger’s use of the design and, thus, 
bore the burden of proof on the matter.  See id. at 77–78.  As a procedural matter, then, this case 
differs somewhat from Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., wherein Knitwaves brought a trade dress 
infringement claim against a competitor and the competitor claimed functionality as a defense.  71 
F.3d 996, 1006 (2d Cir. 1995).  Under those circumstances, Lollytogs had the burden of proof on the 
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Five years later, in Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., the Second Circuit 
again applied the alternative designs formulation of the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine—but reached the opposite outcome.103  In considering 
whether Knitwaves’s line of “fall motif” sweaters bearing designs with 
leaves, acorns, and squirrels was barred from trademark protection because 
of functionality, the court noted that allowing protection to the two specific 
designs at issue would not prevent Lollytogs from creating a unique design 
composed of the same basic elements.104  Though Lollytogs argued that the 
sweater designs were functional because they generated consumer appeal 
beyond association with the Knitwaves brand105—an argument that might 
issue.  See id.; see also LeSportsac, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75–76 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting 
confusion in the Second Circuit as to “whether a plaintiff has the burden of proving 
nonfunctionality . . . or whether a defendant must prove functionality as a defense”). 
 102.  See Wallace, 916 F.2d at 82.  In denying Wallace trademark protection for its design, the 
court drew an explicit analogy to color—which, at the time, was generally not trademarkable.  See 
id. at 81 (“We perceive no distinction between a claim to exclude all others from use on silverware 
of basic elements of a decorative style and claims to generic names, basic colors or designs 
important to a product’s utility.”).  Interestingly, the comparison revealed an important empirical 
assumption central to the court’s reasoning: the court expressed the belief that trademark protection 
sought for design elements like color actually harbored the ulterior motive of excluding competition.  
See id. (“In each case[—generic names, basic colors, or design’s important to utility—], trademark 
protection is sought, not just to protect an owner of a mark in informing the public of the source of 
its products, but also to exclude competitors from producing similar products.”).  It seems that the 
court not only believed diminished competition would result from allowing the trademarking of 
elements like color; it also believed that producers seeking protection for such elements were hoping 
for more than just the protection of the secondary meaning they had developed in their products.  See 
id.  Such an analysis looks like something of a catch-twenty-two: any designer attempting to gain a 
trademark in a color would, by the Second Circuit’s logic, be assumed to depend upon something 
more than secondary meaning; however, because color is defined as a basic design element, 
designers are not even afforded the opportunity to develop secondary meaning in their particular use 
of color.  See id.  It should be noted that this case was decided prior to the Qualitex ruling, so the 
Second Circuit’s empirical assumption was probably partially driven by the prevailing legal practice 
of treating color as incapable of gaining trademark protection.  See infra Part II.A. 
 103.  Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1006.  This decision also came after Qualitex, with the Second Circuit 
paying lip service to the Supreme Court’s definition of functionality before embarking upon an 
analysis according to its own precedent from Wallace.  Id.; see also infra Part III.A. 
 104.  See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1006 (“Lollytogs has adduced no evidence . . . that the number of 
designs available for ‘fall motif’ sweaters is limited, and that . . . extension of trade dress 
protection . . . would restrict Lollytogs’ ability to produce alternative competitive designs.”). 
 105.  Id.  More specifically, Lollytogs attempted to argue that the sweater designs were functional 
because their purpose was to be aesthetically attractive—to generate consumer appeal—and not to 
identify the sweaters with the Knitwaves brand.  Id.  That this argument failed illuminates an 
interesting divergence between the Ninth and Second Circuit approaches to aesthetic functionality: 
under the Ninth Circuit approach, when the design feature at issue is divorced from source-
identification, it is more likely to fall within aesthetic functionality; however, because the Second 
Circuit analysis turns upon the existence of available alternatives, courts within that Circuit do not 
(at least explicitly) engage in an independence analysis.  See id.; see also infra Part II.B.1.  However, 
at least one case in the Second Circuit is plausibly read to suggest that this sort of independence 
analysis actually is performed there—but as part of a threshold analysis that requires identification of 
the principal function of the design feature.  See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1006 (suggesting that a 
feature is more likely to be non-functional if its “principal function is to identify the bag’s maker 
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have prevailed under the Ninth Circuit’s wholly independent aesthetic 
function interpretation106—the court ultimately concluded that Knitwaves’s 
designs could be protected because there was no lack of potential alternative 
designs.107  Unlike in Wallace, where the company sought to trademark the 
basic elements of the style, in Knitwaves the company only sought to 
trademark its specific compilation of the elements.108  Because of this, the 
court found that Knitwaves had a valid, protectable trademark in its two 
sweater designs since such a mark did not foreclose competitors from using 
the same basic elements—fall colors and images of leaves, acorns, and 
squirrels—to create alternative designs.109 
Thus, the doctrine of aesthetic functionality, since first utilized in the 
Pagliero case, has received varying reception in each of the federal 
circuits.110  Of those that have accepted and utilized the doctrine, the 
practices of the Ninth and Second Circuits represent the two most 
prominent, solidified approaches to the issue.111  What is perhaps most 
important to note, however, is the generally nebulous, uncertain nature of the 
doctrine itself: though its existence cannot be denied, aesthetic functionality 
is, at best, an opaque doctrine the application of which is very difficult to 
understand.112  This uncertainty—both as to the substance of the doctrine and 
as to the ways and instances in which it is to be applied—is compounded by 
the Supreme Court’s recent treatment of the doctrine.113 
rather than to make the bag aesthetically pleasing” but concluding that functionality was best 
characterized as a defense, laying the burden on the defendant (quoting LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart 
Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 1985))). 
 106.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 107.  This factual difference would have led to trademark protection for Knitwaves, but for the 
fact that the company had not established secondary meaning in the designs.  See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d 
at 1006–08. 
 108.  See id. at 1006–07. 
 109.  See id. at 1000, 1006. 
 110.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 111.  See supra note 52. 
 112.  One commentator has described the federal treatment of the aesthetic functionality doctrine 
as “an unwarranted and illogical expansion of the functionality policy.”  See MCCARTHY, supra note 
23, § 7:81. 
 113.  See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
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III.  CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
To date, the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the issue of 
aesthetic functionality on the merits.114  It has, however, spoken of the 
doctrine in two prominent cases: Qualitex v. Jacobson Products Co. and 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.115  The Qualitex case 
represented the Court’s first treatment of the issue, and, because of this, the 
current Supreme Court jurisprudence on aesthetic functionality is 
inextricably intertwined with its analysis regarding the trademarking of 
color.116  The TrafFix case involved the Court’s most revealing treatment of 
the aesthetic functionality doctrine, outlining the way in which the doctrine 
should be applied—though it was not actually applied in that particular 
case.117  However, because the aesthetic functionality discussion in both 
cases is technically dicta, the circuit court application of the doctrine has 
been convoluted.118  The current state of the law on aesthetic functionality 
thus amounts to an amalgamation of (1) ambiguous Supreme Court direction 
and (2) uncertain circuit court application.119  Out of such uncertainty came 
(3) Louboutin, a district court case that purported to create a Qualitex carve-
out in the fashion industry, and the Second Circuit review of which served 
 114.  See Markov, supra note 76, at 197. 
 115.  See supra note 113. 
 116.  See Markov, supra note 76, at 197.  This renders the Louboutin case particularly 
noteworthy, because it represents a manifestation of the tension between the Court’s unequivocal 
holding that a single color can be properly trademarked and its apparent approval of the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165.  For a discussion of the merits of the 
Louboutin case, see infra Part III.C.  The Louboutin case, 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012), which was technically a holding with 
regards to Louboutin’s motion for a preliminary injunction, was appealed to the Second Circuit and 
argued before that court on January 24, 2011.  See Alison Frankel, Shoes and Herrings Are Red in 
2d Cir. Louboutin Argument, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Jan. 24, 2012, 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/01_-
_January/Shoes_and_herrings_are_red_in_2d_Cir__Louboutin_argument/.   
  On September 5, 2012, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, rejecting 
what it indentified as the district court’s application of a per se rule against colormarking in the 
fashion industry while neglecting to reach the functionality issue on the merits.  See Christian 
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc. (Louboutin II), 696 F.3d 206, 223, 225 
(2d. Cir. 2012); see also infra Part III.C.2.  In the wake of the Second Circuit decision, YSL dropped 
it’s remaining claims against Louboutin, ultimately disposing of the case between the two parties.  
See Charlotte Cowles, YSL Files Motion to Dismiss Louboutin Case, N.Y. MAG–THE CUT, Nov. 16, 
2012, http://nymag.com/thecut/2012/10/ysl-files-motion-to-dismiss-louboutin-case.html.  However, 
because the Second Circuit opinion failed to address the district court’s formulation of the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine on the merirts, the correct application of the doctrine remains very much in 
doubt. 
 117.  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32–33. 
 118.  See Markov, supra note 76, at 197. 
 119.  See infra Parts III.A–B. 
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only to render the proper application of the aesthetic functionality doctrine 
even more difficult to discern.120 
A.  The Supreme Court and Aesthetic Functionality: Qualitex and TrafFix 
In Qualitex, the Supreme Court positioned the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine as a gatekeeper against the improper trademarking of color.121  
Though the major holding of that case dealt clearly and explicitly with 
whether a single color on a consumer product could be validly 
trademarked,122 the Court invoked the aesthetic functionality doctrine as an 
important aspect of its decision.123  Indeed, because the Court rested its 
colormarking decision on the ability of color to meet the “basic legal 
requirements for use as a trademark”—those requirements being (1) the 
ability to obtain secondary meaning by acting “as a symbol that 
distinguishes a firm’s goods and identifies their source” without (2) serving 
other functions beyond source-identification—the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine is central to the Court’s colormarking decision.124  That this is the 
case is clear from a close examination of Qualitex. 
The Qualitex opinion can be divided into two parts.125  In the first part, 
the Court addressed three legal and policy-related reasons why color alone 
could be validly trademarked: its ability to act as a symbol, its ability to 
acquire secondary meaning, and its ability to be nonfunctional.126  In the 
second part, the Court rebutted the respondent’s four “special reasons why 
the law should forbid the use of color alone as a trademark.”127  The 
centrality of aesthetic functionality to the Court’s ultimate holding is 
revealed by an understanding of the relationship between the two aspects of 
the opinion. 
In the first part, the Court examines fundamental trademark principles; 
applying each in turn to the issue of color alone, it proceeds to conclude that 
 120.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 457; see also infra Part III.C. 
 121.  See 514 U.S. at 169–70; see also Part II.A. 
 122.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166. 
 123.  See id. at 169–70. 
 124.  See id. at 166–70. 
 125.  See id. at 162–74. 
 126.  See id. at 162–66; see also Elizabeth A. Overcamp, The Qualitex Monster: The Color 
Trademark Disaster, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 595, 609 (1995) (deconstructing the Qualitex analysis 
according to the ability of color to “act as a symbol,” “[acquire] secondary meaning,” and “perform 
no other nontrademark function”). 
 127.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166–67. 
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there is no legal impediment to colormarking.128  First, the Court asks 
whether or not color is “within the universe of things that can qualify as a 
trademark.”129  In broad strokes, this question goes to whether or not color 
can act as a “symbol or device” within the meaning of the Lanham Act.130  
The Court concludes that color meets this requirement.131  Second, the Court 
asks whether or not color is capable of attaining secondary meaning—of 
“signifying a brand.”132  The Court concludes that color is also capable of 
meeting this requirement.133  Finally, the Court addresses the “functionality” 
doctrine.134  Noting that the purpose of the functionality doctrine is to 
“[prevent] trademark law . . . from . . . inhibiting legitimate competition by 
allowing a producer to control a useful product feature,”135 and defining 
functionality to include those product features “essential to the use or 
purpose of the article or . . . affect[ing] the cost or quality of the article,”136 
the Court concludes that color is capable of being nonfunctional in that it 
may sometimes serve no purpose beyond source identification.137  After 
addressing each of these three issues in turn, the Court incorporates them 
into its holding: because color can “act as a symbol that distinguishes a 
firm’s goods and identifies their source, without serving any other 
significant function,” it can be validly trademarked.138  This means that the 
Court’s colormarking conclusion rests on a functionality determination.139  
 128.  See id. at 166 (“[C]olor alone . . . can meet the basic legal requirements for use as a 
trademark.”); see also Overcamp, supra note 126, at 610. 
 129.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. 
 130.  See id.; see also Overcamp, supra note 126, at 609–10 (defining and employing this 
particular manner of deconstructing the Qualitex analysis). 
 131.  Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162 (“If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can act as symbols why, one 
might ask, can a color not do the same?”). 
 132.  Id. at 163. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 164–66. 
 135.  Id. at 164. 
 136.  Id. at 165 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 (1982)). 
 137.  Id. 
Although color sometimes plays an important role (unrelated to source-identification) in 
making a product more desirable, sometimes it does not.  And, this latter fact—the fact 
that sometimes color is not essential to a product’s use or purpose and does not affect cost 
or quality—indicates that the doctrine of ‘functionality’ does not create an absolute bar to 
the use of color alone as a mark. 
Id. 
 138.  Id. at 166. 
 139.  This determination need not necessarily be an aesthetic functionality determination in all 
cases.  See id. at 164–65, 69 (citing the “functionality doctrine” but also citing the Restatement 
definition of aesthetic functionality).  However, because color is by nature an aesthetic entity with 
primarily aesthetic properties, the functionality determination made in colormarking cases is 
extremely likely to involve application of aesthetic functionality.  See id.  Moreover, there is some 
inherent difficulty in drawing a clear line between utilitarian functionality and aesthetic functionality 
where color is concerned.  See id.  Consider, for instance, some of the color cases cited by the Court 
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Because color alone can only be validly trademarked where it is 
nonfunctional, the functionality determination is necessarily antecedent to 
the trademark determination—under Qualitex, all colormarking decisions 
will require a functionality determination.140  Moreover, the aesthetic 
functionality conclusion will be dispositive of the trademark issue; where a 
color is found to be functional under the Qualitex definition, it will become 
automatically ineligible for trademark protection.141  Because the Court’s 
analysis is structured in this way, the Qualitex opinion’s treatment of the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine—its substantive language vis-à-vis the 
issue—is more than incidental to the Court’s colormarking jurisprudence.142  
Indeed, the Qualitex decision not only subsumes the doctrine into its legal 
analysis, it also imbues the doctrine with an important policy-related role—
making it the gatekeeper against improper colormarking. 
In the second part of the Qualitex decision, the Court examines each of 
the respondent’s four best arguments against allowing the trademarking of a 
single color.143  The first, third, and fourth arguments relate, respectively, to 
the problem of shade confusion,144 the issue of pre-Lanham Act precedent,145 
and the futility of allowing colormarking where trade dress law provides 
independent intellectual property protection.146  The second argument 
invokes the problem of color depletion, which is the notion that, because the 
color spectrum is limited, allowing trademark protection of a single color on 
in Qualitex: perhaps the ability of the color black to “[decrease] the apparent size of [outboard 
motors]” is a primarily utilitarian function rather than a primarily aesthetic one.  Id. at 169 (citing 
Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 140.  See id. at 169–70. 
 141.  See id. 
 142.  Indeed, it is integral.  It is because of this reality that the Court needs to address the issue of 
aesthetic functionality on the merits in an explicit way—the current uncertainty and lack of clarity in 
the law does not simply affect determinations of aesthetic functionality as an independent issue; it 
also affects the Court’s colormarking jurisprudence.  See supra note 116 and accompanying text.  
The opinion of the district court in Louboutin well illustrates this: the Court’s failure to clarify the 
correct application of the doctrine necessarily disintegrates its Qualitex holding, particularly in the 
context of cases like Louboutin.  See infra Part IV.  This is why the Court should address the issue—
and why the Louboutin holding may have broader reverberations and ramifications for overall 
trademark jurisprudence than the individual parties themselves understand.  See infra Part IV.B.  In 
short, any examination of the issue needs to take into account the effect that a Qualitex carve-out, 
generated by the aesthetic functionality inquiry, would have on colormarking at large.  See infra Part 
IV.C. (arguing that Louboutin goes against the explicit holding of Qualitex). 
 143.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 167–74. 
 144.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 145.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 146.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 173–74.  Trade dress protection exists under § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.  See Cohen, supra note 49, at 605–07. 
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a product will limit the color supply from which competing producers can 
draw.147  This argument reflects one of the major policy reasons underlying 
the traditional practice overturned by the Qualitex decision.148 
The Court recognizes this argument’s animating concern—that 
colormarking easily lends itself to the hindrance of competition because the 
color supply is inherently limited—as legitimate.149  However, it suggests 
that the likelihood that this potential for color depletion will actualize into a 
practical problem is slim, particularly because the functionality doctrine is 
“available to prevent the anticompetitive consequences that Jacobson’s 
argument posits.”150  In responding to this criticism, then, the Court 
references its earlier treatment of aesthetic functionality in the first part of 
the opinion: it suggests that “when, and if, the circumstances of a particular 
case threaten ‘color depletion,’” functionality will act like a gatekeeper, 
ensuring that where color performs a “significant nontrademark function” it 
will be disqualified from protection.151 
Thus, because the Qualitex holding was made with reference to the 
conclusion that color alone is both (1) capable of acquiring secondary 
meaning and (2) being nonfunctional,152 the Court was able to write off 
respondent’s concerns about color depletion.  Essentially, the Court 
condensed those concerns into a policy of maintaining fair competition and 
summarily dismissed them by noting that protection of competition was 
already embedded in the test in the form of the functionality determination; 
in other words, because functionality would require the weighing of such 
competitive concerns, and since no color could garner protection without 
establishing nonfunctionality,153 the point was moot.154 
In this way, the Court’s discussion of functionality in the second part of 
the Qualitex decision animates the legal notion of functionality upon which 
it rested its holding.155  Because the Court not only addressed the 
functionality doctrine within its holding but also positioned the doctrine as a 
 147.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 168. 
 148.  See supra Part II.A. 
 149.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 168. 
[I]n the context of a particular product, only some colors are usable . . . [a]nd, under these 
circumstances, to permit one, or a few, producers to use colors as trademarks will 
“deplete” the supply of usable colors to the point where a competitor’s inability to find a 
suitable color will put the competitor at a significant disadvantage. 
Id. 
 150.  See id. at 169. 
 151.  Id. at 170. 
 152.  See infra Part II.B. 
 153.  See infra Part II.B. 
 154.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 168–69. 
 155.  See supra notes 134–42 and accompanying text. 
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mechanism for checking anticompetitive colormarking,156 its substantive 
treatment of the doctrine is important for any lower court attempting to 
properly apply the Qualitex decision.  Broadly speaking, this substantive 
treatment encompassed three aspects. 
First, the Court connected the purpose of the doctrine to the insulation of 
competition.157  In so doing, it suggested that the doctrine should be applied 
only where trademarking a feature would place competitors at a “significant 
disadvantage because the feature is [either] ‘essential to the use or purpose 
of the article’or ‘affects [its] cost or quality.’”158  In other words, the Court 
connected functionality to competition by suggesting that the doctrine 
should be applied with an eye toward market impact: a feature is not 
functional simply where it is “essential to the use or purpose” of a product or 
affects that product’s cost or quality; rather, it is functional if it does either 
of these things and also significantly hinders competition within the industry 
at issue.159 
Second, the Court implicated both Second Circuit “alternative design”160 
reasoning and Ninth Circuit “wholly independent”161 reasoning in its 
explanation of aesthetic functionality.  In the second portion of its opinion, 
the Court specifically cites to the Restatement Third of Unfair Competition 
for the proposition that functionality exists where “a design’s ‘aesthetic 
value’ lies in its ability to ‘confer a significant benefit that cannot practically 
be duplicated by the use of alternative designs.’”162  This suggests that a 
feature’s functionality should be measured by the availability of alternative 
designs.  The Court also, however, describes functionality as a doctrine that 
“protects competitors against . . . their inability to . . . replicate important 
non-reputation-related product features.”163  This description seems to 
implicate the Ninth Circuit’s “wholly independent” type of analysis by 
suggesting that functionality is only meant to disqualify from trademark 
protection those “important product ingredient[s]” that are “unrelated to 
 156.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169. 
 157.  See id. 
 158.  See id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, 
Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10 (1982)). 
 159.  See id.  The Court supports this position with reference to the Restatement of Unfair 
Competition, incorporating its conclusion that “the ultimate test of aesthetic functionality . . . is 
whether the recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder competition.”  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c. 
 160.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 161.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 162.  Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170. 
 163.  Id. at 169. 
05 PARMENTER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:24 PM 
 
1068 
recognition or reputation.”164  In sum, the Court intimates that the animating 
force behind the application of the aesthetic functionality doctrine should be 
protection of fair competition, but it cites to both of the prominent circuit 
approaches as methods of implementing this policy goal without recognizing 
any difference between the two.165  Even more confusingly, the Court’s 
opinion could plausibly be read to suggest either (1) that both approaches 
should be applied or (2) that either approach can be applied, as long as it 
appropriately measures the harm to competition in the particular situation.166 
Finally, the Court employed important limiting language in its 
discussion of the functionality doctrine.  Whatever the confusion 
surrounding the rest of the Court’s discussion of the doctrine, the opinion 
consistently uses the words “significant” and “important” to describe the 
nature of the benefit conveyed by a functional feature and the extent to 
which the feature must contribute to competitive advantage.167  In the first 
place, the Court describes the competitive advantage conveyed by a 
functional feature as “significant,” stating that a design feature should only 
be disqualified from trademark protection where granting such protection 
would “put a competitor at a significant disadvantage.”168  The Court also 
calls the function itself “significant,” summarizing its approach thusly: 
“where a color serves a significant nontrademark function . . . courts will 
examine whether its use as a mark would permit one competitor . . . to 
interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-related) competition through actual 
or potential exclusive use of an important product ingredient.”169  Thus, the 
Court qualifies its approach with this unequivocal language.  Though the 
opinion may be unclear as to what standard should be applied in determining 
whether there is a competitive “benefit”—whether the measure should be 
available alternative designs or the existence of some function completely 
divorced from source-identification—it is unequivocal that this “benefit” 
must be significant.170  Though the Court provides little clue as to what will 
qualify as significant in applying the aesthetic functionality test, the fact that 
it delimits its language in this way is noteworthy: functional design features 
must not only be extant, they must be impactful such that the courts can 
foresee that allowing trademark protection will result in monopoly.171  In 
 164.  Id. at 169–70. 
 165.  See supra Part II.B. 
 166.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170 (“[C]ourts will examine whether [a feature’s] use as a mark 
would permit one competitor . . . to interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-related) competition 
through actual or potential exclusive use of an important product ingredient.”). 
 167.  See id. at 169–70. 
 168.  See id. at 169. 
 169.  Id. at 170 (emphasis added). 
 170.  See id. 
 171.  See id. 
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some ways, this looks like a higher burden of proof than that embedded in 
either of the two circuit approaches.172  It appears to require both (1) a 
determination that a design feature is functional; and (2) the separate 
conclusion that this functionality, in the specific case, rises above some 
threshold of significance.173 
In Qualitex, then, the Court addressed the issue of aesthetic functionality 
as part and parcel of its broader colormarking conclusion.  Because the 
Court’s ultimate legal holding—that there is no reason to deny trademark 
protection to color alone where it both (1) acquires secondary meaning and 
(2) is nonfunctional—contained a functionality determination, its substantive 
definition of functionality and discussion of the doctrine’s application has 
import for any lower court dealing with the doctrine, whether within or 
outside of the colormarking context.  To put it simply, it is difficult to give 
effect to the Court’s colormarking conclusion without addressing 
functionality; inversely, it is difficult to address functionality without legal 
conclusions regarding that issue feeding back into the colormarking holding.  
Unfortunately, the Court’s guidance on functionality is unclear at best—
meaning that lower court decisions dealing with functionality on the merits 
are faced with an interesting conundrum: on the one hand, they have, in the 
form of Qualitex, some Supreme Court intimation regarding the issue; on the 
other hand, this guidance neither qualifies as binding precedent nor provides 
any clear direction in and of itself.174  At least one circuit has explicitly 
confronted this situation to interesting effect.175  Before examining the 
impact upon the circuit courts, however, attention must be paid to the other 
Supreme Court case touching upon the issue of aesthetic functionality: 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.176 
Six years after the Supreme Court ruled in Qualitex, it again 
encountered aesthetic functionality in the form of a trade dress infringement 
case out of the Sixth Circuit.177  In TrafFix, the Court addressed the issue of 
whether or not TrafFix’s copying of Marketing Displays (MDI)’s dual-
 172.  See supra Part II.B. 
 173.  This conclusion is somewhat complicated by the fact that the Court creatively cites to G.K. 
Chesterton’s essay “Simplicity and Tolstoy” for the notion that the ability of a color to “satisfy the 
‘noble instinct for giving the right touch of beauty to common and necessary things’” might qualify 
as a “significant” function.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170 (quoting G.K. CHESTERSTON, SIMPLICITY 
AND TOLSTOY 61 (1921)). 
 174.  Markov, supra note 76, at 197. 
 175.  The Ninth Circuit confronted the issue and construed the doctrine in Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. 
v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).  See infra Part III.B. 
 176.  532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 177.  Id. 
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spring design for its roadside signs constituted trade dress infringement.178  
On the particular issue of functionality, the Sixth Circuit had overruled the 
trial court, determining that “allowing exclusive use of . . . the dual-spring 
design” did not rise above the “significance” threshold set forth in 
Qualitex.179  The Supreme Court, however, said that the Sixth Circuit had 
applied the wrong test: it had failed to see the distinction between utilitarian 
functionality and aesthetic functionality that the Court (apparently) wanted 
to maintain.180  The Court then stated that the significance threshold only 
applied in cases of aesthetic functionality; where a design feature is 
utilitarian in nature—meaning it is either “essential to the use or purpose of 
the device” or “affects the cost or quality of the device,”181—the significance 
to competition need not be additionally examined.182  The TrafFix Court also 
explicitly recognized aesthetic functionality as “the central question” of the 
Qualitex case, meaning that the application of the significance threshold 
beyond aesthetic functionality issues was improper.183  In asserting that the 
Sixth Circuit had missed the mark, though, the Supreme Court failed to 
criticize its substantive “significance” definition: though the Court did say 
that the circuit should not have asked whether allowing a trademark of the 
dual-spring design would place competitors at a significant disadvantage, it 
did not say that the circuit was incorrect in defining “significant” to connote 
a design feature that was a “competitive necessity.”184 
In this way, the TrafFix decision adds three things to the present 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on aesthetic functionality under Qualitex.185  
First, it creates a two-pronged functionality analysis that clarifies Qualitex’s 
ambiguity regarding “functionality” versus “aesthetic functionality.”186  
Under this test, utilitarian functionality requires a single inquiry: where a 
design feature is either “essential to the use or purpose” of the object or has 
an affect on its cost or quality, it will be deemed functional and disallowed 
trademark protection.187  Where a feature does not fall into either of those 
two categories, and is thus aesthetic in nature, its exclusive use must threaten 
to put competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage” if it 
 178.  Id. at 26. 
 179.  Id. at 27, 32–33. 
 180.  Id. at 33. 
 181.  Id.  In other words, when it is functional in a utilitarian sense.   
 182.  The significance to competition where utilitarian functionality is implicated could plausibly 
be characterized as either irrelevant or assumed.  See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33. 
 183.  Id.  Prominent scholar J. Thomas McCarthy finds this proposition—that aesthetic 
functionality was the “central question” of Qualitex—untenable.  MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 7.80. 
 184.  See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32. 
 185.  See supra notes 128–74 and accompanying text. 
 186.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 187.  See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32–33. 
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is to be found functional.188  Second, it clarifies the centrality of aesthetic 
functionality to the Qualitex holding.189  Though this statement qualifies as 
dicta,190 it nevertheless confirms the notion that the Qualitex holding 
contained aesthetic functionality considerations.191  Finally, it provides 
support for the notion that the Supreme Court’s standard—insofar as it has 
been articulated—contains a significance threshold that may limit the 
application of the aesthetic functionality doctrine beyond either of the two 
prominent circuit approaches.192  Understanding this current, somewhat 
confused state of the law at the Supreme Court level, the nature of the most 
recent Ninth Circuit treatment of the issue becomes more accessible.193 
B.  Aesthetic Functionality in the Lower Courts Since Qualitex and TrafFix 
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit addressed the merits of an aesthetic 
functionality argument where the Auto Gold company claimed aesthetic 
functionality to protect its unlicensed sale of key rings, license plates, and 
automobile accessories bearing Audi and Volkswagen insignia.194  The court 
ultimately concluded that the doctrine did not apply, and the process by 
which it did so illuminates the difficulty of aesthetic functionality issues 
post-Qualitex and TrafFix.195  In the first place, the court addressed the 
Supreme Court treatment of the issue; indeed, it explicitly stated that it was 
“quot[ing] extensively from the passages that set out the appropriate inquiry 
for functionality” in order to “be absolutely clear” in restating the Court’s 
position.196  The court then went on to lay out the two-prong functionality 
test expressed in TrafFix: it correctly related the Court’s conclusion that in 
questions of aesthetic functionality, courts applying the doctrine must 
“inquire into a ‘significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.’”197  But 
when the court attempted to apply this test to the facts of the particular case, 
 188.  See id. (emphasis added). 
 189.  See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 190.  The court never reached the aesthetic functionality issue, deciding the case on the first prong 
of the two-part test.  See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33–34. 
 191.  See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See supra Part II.B. 
 193.  See Markov, supra note 76, at 197–98. 
 194.  See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the facts and resolution of the case in the context of 
the aesthetic functionality jurisprudence in the Ninth Circuit. 
 195.  See Markov, supra note 76, at 203–10. 
 196.  Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 197.  Id. (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001)). 
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it got tripped up on the ambiguity of the Court’s “significance” language.198  
The confusion manifests in two specific ways. 
First, the court is unsure whether the aesthetic functionality inquiry, 
under Supreme Court precedent, should be solely focused on the “significant 
non-reputation-related disadvantage” question.199  Though the Court invokes 
this language several times,200 its substantive analysis draws upon the circuit 
precedent—which applies a “wholly independent” test.201  In other words, it 
appears as if the court is unsure whether to both apply (1) its own test for 
determining aesthetic functionality and then (2) ask if the feature should be 
disqualified from trademark protection because it passes a certain 
“significance” threshold per Supreme Court precedent,202 or reduce the 
analysis into a single inquiry as to whether the design feature’s exclusive use 
would place competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.203  The court does appear to find some middle ground, 
however, by suggesting that aesthetically functional features might be 
categorically trademark-related—and thus that where it would find a feature 
to be functional under its own, “wholly independent” test, such a feature 
 198.  See Markov, supra note 76, at 204 (“Despite [its] commendable (and technically correct) 
start, however, the Ninth Circuit never came back to the Supreme Court’s language in either TrafFix 
Devices or Qualitex that required the resolution of the question as to whether Auto Gold’s 
trademarks put competitors at a ‘significant non-reputation-related disadvantage’ again.”). 
 199.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1072. 
 200.  Id. at 1071–72 (“In the case of a claim of aesthetic functionality, an alternative test inquires 
whether protection of the feature as a trademark would impose a significant non-reputation-related 
competitive disadvantage” and “we read the Court’s decision to mean that consideration of 
competitive necessity may be an appropriate but not necessary element of the functionality 
analysis.”). 
 201.  See Markov, supra note 76, at 204; see also Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1073. 
 202.  It is herein suggested that this is a plausible way to read the Qualitex decision.  See infra 
Parts III–IV. 
 203.  Note that this interpretation leaves open the question of how the disadvantage would be 
measured; really, what this Comment frames as the two most prominent circuit approaches to the 
issue can plausibly be understood as different ways of measuring the disadvantage: the “wholly 
independent” measure asks if the disadvantage can be divorced from an advantage fairly gained 
through good branding and quality source-identification, while the “alternative designs” measure 
asks if the disadvantage can be overcome through competitive resourcefulness.  See supra Part II.A–
B.  In other words, even if the analysis were collapsed into a single inquiry about competitive 
disadvantage, it would probably still practically require the application of some test meant to 
measure the extent of the disadvantage in any individual case; thus, the way this Comment frames 
the issue—that the Supreme Court precedent can plausibly be read as requiring both an initial 
functionality determination (asking whether the feature falls within the universe of aesthetic design 
features that might be potentially disqualified from trademark protection) and also that the 
functionality itself be of such a magnitude that the court finds it liable to result in market 
monopolization—is artificial to the degree that it is also plausible to suggest that both inquiries are 
one and the same thing (i.e., that asking whether a design feature could potentially work a 
significant, non-reputation-related disadvantage can be the sole inquiry measuring whether or not a 
feature falls within the universe of design features potentially disqualified from trademark 
protection).  See supra Part II. 
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would always, necessarily, qualify as functional under the Supreme Court’s 
test.204  Such a formulation, though it represents a clever reconciliation of 
Ninth Circuit precedent and Supreme Court reasoning, is problematic in that 
it ignores the significance variable—just because a design feature could be 
shown to perform some function wholly independent of source-identification 
does not necessarily mean that the same feature’s exclusive use will work a 
significant competitive disadvantage.205  This, in turn, results in a further 
difficulty—the court’s uncertainty about what “significant” means. 
Second, the court seems uncertain of how to construe the “significance” 
determination itself.206  While it seems to adopt the “competitive necessity” 
language used by the Sixth Circuit in TrafFix207—almost using “significant 
disadvantage” and “competitive necessity” interchangeably within the 
opinion208—it also fails to apply this definition to the facts of the case.209  
Thus, while it is interesting that the court does not seem to find TrafFix to be 
disapproving of the Sixth Circuit’s substantive reading of the Qualitex 
opinion,210 it is difficult to locate the meaning that the Ninth Circuit itself 
actually attaches to the significance inquiry—because it never asks if there is 
a competitive need for the particular design insignia at issue such that 
granting trademark rights would monopolize the automobile accessory 
industry.211  In this way, the court’s uncertainty with regard to the form of 
 204.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1073 (“The concept of an ‘aesthetic’ function that is 
non-trademark-related has enjoyed only limited application.”).  Markov, supra note 76, at 204, 
suggests that the Ninth Circuit exploited the uncertainty in the law to get around performing the test 
as laid out by the Supreme Court—that it alluded to TrafFix while applying its own “wholly 
independent” test.  See supra Part II.B.1.  But the opinion seems marked more by confusion than 
affirmative refusal to follow Supreme Court precedent.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1072 
(“[W]here do we stand in the wake of forty years of trademark law scattered with references to 
aesthetic functionality?”). 
 205.  For instance, a feature might serve as an aesthetic reference to a bygone era, see Christian 
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012), but this does not necessarily mean that denying 
other designers the ability to use the same feature in the same way to achieve the same aesthetic 
reference would amount to a significant competitive disadvantage.  It should also be noted that the 
Restatement of Unfair Competition, which the Court cited in Qualitex, calls the significance inquiry 
the ultimate one—suggesting that it should be in addition to or beyond some initial, definitive 
inquiry.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
17 cmt. c. 
 206.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1072. 
 207.  See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001). 
 208.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1071. 
 209.  See id. 
 210.  See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 211.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1071–73. 
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the Supreme Court’s analysis also gives way to an inability to unpack the 
content of its language: because the Ninth Circuit did not know whether the 
aesthetic functionality inquiry should be one- or two-fold, and ended up 
collapsing the analysis into a single step that incorporated its own, pre-
Qualitex and TrafFix approach, it failed to apply what might be the most 
unambiguous aspect of the Supreme Court’s aesthetic functionality 
jurisprudence—its requirement that the anticompetitive consequences of 
granting trademark protection to aesthetically functional features be 
significant.212 
An examination of the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to incorporate Supreme 
Court language into its Au-Tomotive Gold decision demonstrates just how 
fraught with confusion is the current law of aesthetic functionality.  In the 
first place, the Supreme Court itself has been exceedingly unclear.213  This 
lack of clarity is not aided by the fact that the Court has not addressed the 
issue on the merits, but has nevertheless suggested that it composed the 
“central question” of the Qualitex case.214  Additionally, the circuits—
particularly the Ninth—attempting to incorporate the Qualitex and TrafFix 
opinions into their aesthetic functionality jurisprudence have faced analytical 
hurdles with regard to both the structure of the analysis and its substance.215  
Into this legal minefield came the recent Louboutin case.216 
C.  Qualitex Comes to Fashion: Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent 
The Louboutin decision comprised the seminal—and controversial—
application of colormarking to the high fashion industry.217  Prior to federal 
district court judge Victor Marrero’s ruling in August of 2011 and the 
Second Circuit’s review of Louboutin’s appeal in 2012, most of the judicial 
treatment of colormarking and aesthetic functionality had taken place in 
industries entirely different from the milieu of haute couture.218  Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine a factual scenario more fundamentally different from the 
legal battle between the two French fashion icons than that of Qualitex itself, 
which dealt with the color of industrial dry cleaning pads.219  But the 
transplanting of such legal precedent into the world of high fashion has 
 212.  See supra Part III.A. 
 213.  See supra Part III.A. 
 214.  See supra note 183. 
 215.  See Markov, supra note 76, at 203–08. 
 216.  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 217.  See id. 
 218.  See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (tractor 
industry). 
 219.  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
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accomplished something very interesting—it has brought into relief the 
theoretical difficulties surrounding the doctrine of aesthetic functionality and 
the confusion inherent in the Qualitex decision.  The district court’s refusal 
to grant Louboutin a preliminary injunction on the basis of its registered Red 
Sole Mark represents the latest and most far-reaching expression of the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine.220  And, though the Second Circuit 
ultimately rejected the district court’s formulation and overturned its 
extreme decision, it declined to apply its own test of functionality to the 
Louboutin issue, facilitating future uncertainty as to the appropriate 
standard.221 
1.  Louboutin I: Aesthetic Functionality Applied to Create a Qualitex 
Carve-Out 
In the case, Christian Louboutin brought actions for trademark 
infringement and unfair competition against YSL, its competitor in the 
designer shoe industry, regarding four shoe designs from YSL’s Cruise 2011 
collection that Louboutin alleged were confusingly similar to Louboutin’s 
signature red sole.222  According to Louboutin, the YSL shoes—which 
incorporated red outsoles into several monochromatic red designs—
infringed his registered Red Sole Mark; Louboutin thus sought a preliminary 
injunction against YSL’s continued sale of the shoes.223  The court refused to 
grant the injunction and strongly suggested that Louboutin’s mark should be 
invalidated.224  In doing so, it relied upon the doctrine of aesthetic 
functionality.225 
The court began its examination of the issue by asking whether 
Louboutin’s red sole merited trademark protection in the first place.226  It 
framed the question as whether Louboutin could hold a valid mark in the 
application of a single color to the outsole of shoes in the high fashion 
industry and stated the Qualitex rule that “[c]olor alone ‘sometimes’ may be 
protectable as a trademark . . . if it ‘acts as a symbol that distinguishes a 
firm’s goods and identifies their source, without serving any other 
 220.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
 221.  See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc. (Louboutin II), 696 
F.3d 206, 228 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 222.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
 223.  See id. 
 224.  See id. at 457. 
 225.  See id. at 453–54. 
 226.  See id. at 448. 
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significant function.’”227  As to the first prong of that analysis, the secondary 
meaning determination, the court accepted that Louboutin has gained 
secondary meaning in the red sole, a reality demonstrated by pop culture 
references, consumer studies, and recognition by other high fashion 
designers.228  Before going on to analyze the significance question under the 
functionality prong, however, the court seemed to come to the abrupt 
conclusion that color as a design feature in the fashion industry would 
always be functional: after noting that color alone has been validly marked 
in some industries, the court went on to distinguish fashion by observing that 
“in fashion markets color serves not solely to identify sponsorship or source, 
but is used in designs primarily to advance expressive, ornamental and 
aesthetic purposes,” and, thus, “there is something unique about the fashion 
world that militates against extending trademark protection to a single 
color.”229  The court then analyzed aesthetic functionality.  It defined 
functionality as “forbid[ding] the use of a product’s feature as a trademark 
where doing so will put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because 
the feature is ‘essential to the use or purpose of the article’ or ‘affects [its] 
cost or quality.’”230  The court concluded that the use of red soles as a design 
feature (1) served several “nontrademark”—or non-source-identifying—
functions and (2) affected the cost and quality of the shoes.231  Because of 
these conclusions, the court “examin[ed] whether granting trademark rights 
for Louboutin’s use of the color red as a brand would ‘significantly hinder 
competition,’”232 and it found that allowing Louboutin’s mark would affect 
such a hindrance in that it would prevent YSL (or other high fashion 
designers) from “achieving those stylistic goals” necessary to effective 
competition in the industry.233 
When examined in light of the Supreme Court precedent from Qualitex 
and TrafFix,234 there are several problems with this analysis—all of which 
illustrate the current confused state of aesthetic functionality law and only 
some of which were clarified by the Second Circuit’s review.  First, the 
court improperly stated the broad aesthetic functionality rule.  The 
functionality rule from Qualitex, as clarified by TrafFix, is two-fold.  A 
design feature may be functional under the utilitarian definition of 
 227.  Id. at 450 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995)). 
 228.  See id. at 447–48 (“The issue now before the Court is whether, despite Christian 
Louboutin’s acknowledged innovation and the broad association of the high fashion red outsole with 
him as its source, trademark protection should not have been granted to that registration.”). 
 229.  Id. at 451. 
 230.  Id. at 453 (alteration in original) (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169). 
 231.  Id. at 453–54; see also infra note 242. 
 232.  Louboutin, 788 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  See supra Part III.A. 
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functionality where it is “essential to the use or purpose” of an article or 
“affects the cost or quality” of the article; if it satisfies either of those 
requirements, no further inquiry is necessary.235  Only if a feature does not 
fall into either of those categories should the court ask whether allowing the 
feature to be trademarked would effect a “significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.”236  The district court’s understanding, then, is incorrect on 
several levels: the court is wrong to connect the competitive advantage to the 
design feature’s impact on the use, purpose, cost, or quality of the article—
the disadvantage need not exist because of the impact on any of those things; 
rather, once the court concluded that the red sole did affect the use, purpose, 
cost, or quality of the shoe, it should have ended its inquiry.237  Second, the 
court improperly performed an aesthetic functionality analysis after it had 
concluded that the red sole feature was functional under a utilitarian 
definition.238  This aspect of the court’s analysis is particularly confused 
because of the indistinct application of some key terms: though the Supreme 
Court was clear in TrafFix that the aesthetic functionality inquiry should not 
be concerned with the purpose, use, cost, or quality of the item at issue, it 
was not entirely clear as to when the inquiry necessarily became an aesthetic 
one—meaning that, even in scenarios like the Louboutin case, where the 
issue clearly seems aesthetic in nature, it might plausibly be resolved on the 
first prong of the TrafFix test.239  Much of the confusion likely derives from 
the difficulty of locating what qualifies as “utilitarian” in the high fashion 
industry—a milieu to which the lay definition of the word would not 
apply.240  Yet, even allowing for this sort of confusion, the court (were it 
properly applying Qualitex as clarified in TrafFix241) would still have halted 
its examination at the determination that the red sole affected the cost and 
 235.  Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 450. 
 236.  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001). 
 237.  See id. 
 238.  See id. 
 239.  It is almost possible to say that the court was able to make an end run around the competitive 
advantage analysis—except that it did not, it performed one.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454–
55 (“Because the use of red outsoles serves nontrademark functions other than as a source identifier, 
and affects the cost and quality of the shoe, the Court must examine whether granting trademark 
rights for Louboutin’s use of the color red as a brand would ‘significantly hinder competition.’” 
(quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995))). 
 240.  This of course demonstrates the difficulty of applying a case like TrafFix to the high fashion 
industry.  See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 241.  Interestingly, the Louboutin court failed to cite to TrafFix, seeming to base its decision on a 
pure interpretation of Qualitex without taking into account the modifications of TrafFix.  See 
Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454–55; see also supra Part III.A. 
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quality of the shoe.242  Instead, the court proceeded to apply a competitive 
disadvantage analysis, and even went so far as to suggest that it did so 
because it had determined that the red sole affected the shoe’s cost and 
quality.243  Finally, the court struggled with the significance standard.  In the 
first place, it substituted an analysis of whether the red soles performed any 
significant, nontrademark function for an analysis of whether they could be 
properly categorized as “functional” under the Second Circuit available 
alternative designs test.244  This is not necessarily a problem, as it may 
plausibly be read to involve an attempt at applying Supreme Court language 
to the aesthetic functionality problem.245  However, the court in Louboutin 
failed to account for the relationship between the significance standard and 
the anticompetitive policy animating the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine: by divorcing the significance standard from 
the effect on competition and instead inserting it into a single functionality 
inquiry, the court skipped over the “non-reputation-related” aspect of the 
analysis.246  In this way, the lower court’s application of the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine arguably missed the Supreme Court requirement that 
the doctrine be used so as to disqualify significant, non-reputation-related 
features from protection.247 
2.  Louboutin II: Rejection of a Qualitex Carve-Out Without Application 
of an Aesthetic Functionality Standard 
On September 5, 2012, the Second Circuit decided the interlocutory 
appeal of the district court’s ruling on Louboutin’s preliminary injunction.248  
Affirming the lower court in part and reversing it in part, the court held that 
(1) under Qualitex, a per se rule against colormarking in the fashion industry 
is improper; (2) Louboutin has acquired secondary meaning in the use of a 
 242.  The court concluded that the red sole affects the cost of the shoe because “adding the red 
lacquered finish to a plain raw leather sole is more expensive . . . [but also desirable in the high 
fashion industry because] the higher cost of production . . . makes the final creation that much more 
exclusive;” it also concluded, for less explicit reasons, that the sole affects the quality of the shoe.  
See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
 243.  See id.; see also supra note 241. 
 244.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 245.  As opposed to trying to get around it, like the Ninth Circuit seems to have tried to do in Au-
Tomotive Gold.  See supra Part III.B. 
 246.  In Qualitex and TrafFix, the question is whether the exclusive use of the feature would put 
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.  See supra Part III.A.  By contrast, 
the court in Louboutin looks at: “significant, nontrademark functions” and “threats to legitimate 
competition;” it never asks whether the competitive advantage can be imputed to Louboutin’s 
reputation—which is a fatal flaw of the analysis.  See infra Parts IV–V. 
 247.  See supra Part III.A. 
 248.  See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc. (Louboutin II), 696 
F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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red outsole that “contrasts with the remainder of the shoe;” and (3) as thusly 
limited, the Red Sole Mark is entitled to trademark protection.249  The 
Second Circuit’s review of the district court’s decision resolved only some 
of the problems with the analysis, further reflecting the difficulty faced by 
circuit courts attempting to define and apply the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine in the wake of confusing Supreme Court precedent.250  
Characterizing the district court’s decision as resting upon its erroneous 
conclusion that “a single color can never be protected by trademark in the 
fashion industry,”251 the Second Circuit proceeded to elucidate the applicable 
definition of aesthetic functionality since Qualitex and TrafFix and reject the 
district court’s per se rule against colormarking in the fashion industry—all 
without ever evaluating the aesthetic functionality of the Red Sole Mark 
itself.252 
The Second Circuit’s decision thus appears to recognize the danger of 
the lower court’s broad aesthetic functionality interpretation: a fashion 
industry carve-out from trademark protection.253  However, despite correctly 
identifying the danger, the Second Circuit also effectively injected even 
more uncertainty into the current state of the law by imposing an outer limit 
on the doctrine while simultaneously failing to provide guidance on how to 
apply it.254  Such a decision represents, somewhat ironically, a triumph of 
 249.  See id. at 212.  This determination of the issues dispensed with the trademark infringement 
claim underlying the original suit by Louboutin, but the case was remanded to the district court for 
the resolution of Yves Saint Laurent’s two pending counterclaims.  Id. at 228–29.  One of those 
counterclaims sought cancellation of Louboutin’s mark because either (1) it was functional or (2) it 
was secured by fraud on the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).  Id. at 214.  The 
other sought damages for both tortious interference with business relations and unfair competition.  
Id.  In October of 2012, YSL dismissed these remaining claims, publicly stating its desire to “end 
what was left of the litigation and refocus its energies on its business and its creative designs.” See 
Cowles, supra note 116. 
  Interestingly, this suggests that theoretically Louboutin’s mark, as modified, could still be 
invalidated on the grounds of functionality—especially since the Second Circuit never reached the 
functionality issue.  However, the intricacies of the Circuit’s discussion make this a remote 
possibility, as the court is keen to cast aesthetic functionality as an affirmative defense to trademark 
infringement, meaning that the issue is, at least for this case, moot now that the trademark 
infringement claim has been disposed of.  See id. at 216–17.  Such a formulation overlooks a proper 
reading of the Qualitex decision, which reveals that the aesthetic functionality inquiry is central—
and antecedent—to the colormarking determination.  See supra Part III.A. 
 250.  See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. 
 251.  Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 212. 
 252.  See id. at 225–28. 
 253.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 254.  In other words, though the Second Circuit decision seems to establish with relative clarity 
that color marks should not be deemed functional per se under the aesthetic functionality doctrine, 
see Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 223, it provides no guidance on how the aesthetic functionality 
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form over function: though it certainly rejects the ex ante creation, by 
judicial fiat, of a Qualitex carve-out for the fashion industry,255 it does 
nothing to prevent the creation of an effective (or, at the risk of executing a 
bad pun, functional) carve-out within the industry because it does not 
actually apply the aesthetic functionality test to the facts of the case.256  As 
such, the Second Circuit decision does not foreclose future misapplication of 
the doctrine within the Circuit and does little to cabin the broad 
interpretation encouraged by and encapsulated in the lower court’s 
decision.257 
Despite its limitations, the Second Circuit decision nevertheless resolves 
some of the issues with the district court’s opinion and further reveals the 
extent of the current difficulty faced by courts attempting to apply the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine.  First, the circuit court corrects the lower 
court’s misstatement of the broad aesthetic functionality test, correctly citing 
doctrine should be properly applied to avoid an outcome in which color marks in the fashion 
industry are typically defeated.  Indeed, the court does not even suggest than an outcome amounting 
to an effective carve-out would be improper—all it does is reject the “implementation of a per se rule 
that would deny protection for the use of a single color as a trademark in a particular industrial 
context.”  See id. 
 255.  See infra Part IV.B.1.a–c. 
 256.  The circuit court expressly declined to decide “whether the Louboutin mark . . . [was] 
‘functional.’”  Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 212.  The court was able to avoid such an inquiry by 
characterizing the district court’s ruling as a decision that (1) did nothing more than erect a per se 
rule against colormarking in the fashion industry and (2) placed this per se rule as a barrier to 
trademarkability without conducting analysis.  See id. at 223.  In other words, the Second Circuit 
seems to implicitly accuse the district court of disqualifying the Red Sole Mark solely on the 
grounds that it sought protection in the fashion industry, treating the district court’s suggestion that 
the Mark be invalidated as a result of its a priori conclusion that “there is something unique about the 
fashion world that militates against extending trademark protection to a single color.”  See id. 
(quoting Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 451 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)).  This is arguably a mischaracterization of the district court’s decision, which is 
better read to conclude that the doctrine of aesthetic functionality, as applied, prevents the 
trademarking of a single color as applied to a piece of apparel in the fashion industry.  See 
Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (applying the Qualitex test of significant hindrance of competition 
“[b]ecause the use of red outsoles serves nontrademark functions other than as a source identifier” 
(emphasis added)).  In other words, the Second Circuit treats the district court as if it had 
disqualified the mark outright, when in fact the lower court’s decision is better understood as a 
determination, after analysis, that the doctrine of aesthetic functionality will always disqualify color 
from trademark protection in the fashion industry.  Indeed, the lower court decision does not so 
much assert that color can never be trademarked in the fashion industry as it does that color will 
always be functional in the fashion industry—a theoretical distinction that actually may have 
important practical consequences, because the Second Circuit’s rejection of an a priori per se rule 
does little to prevent the application of the functionality doctrine in a manner that amounts to a 
carve-out.  See supra note 231 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.B.1. 
 257.  In other words, though the Second Circuit concluded that “the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s holding 
that a single color can never serve as a trademark in the fashion industry is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Qualitex,” Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 212, it did not address the 
functionality issue, and thus sheds very little light on whether or not Louboutin’s red sole does 
indeed qualify as aesthetically functional, and, relatedly, on the appropriate way to formulate the 
aesthetic functionality test.  See infra Part IV.B–C. 
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TrafFix’s modification of Qualitex for the proposition that a design feature 
qualifies as functional—and is thus disqualified from trademark 
protection—if it meets the utilitarian definition of functionality by being 
“essential to the use or purpose” of an article or “affect[ing] the cost or 
quality of the article.”258  Having recognized this, the court correctly notes 
that an aesthetic functionality analysis is appropriate only where a feature 
does not qualify under this utilitarian definition.259  Second, though the 
circuit court fails to correct the lower court’s improper application of the 
doctrine because it ultimately does not reach the functionality issue, it does 
highlight this improper application by noting that even if a design feature is 
not functional in the utilitarian sense, it “must still . . . be shown not to have 
a significant effect on competition” to qualify for trademark protection.260  
The circuit court thus correctly recognizes that the aesthetic functionality 
test is not, contrary to the lower court’s analysis, triggered by a finding that 
the feature affects the use, purpose, cost, or quality of the article;261 rather, it 
arises only after the court has determined that the feature does not affect 
such things.  Finally, the Second Circuit, in an effort somewhat parallel to 
that of the Ninth Circuit in Au-Tomotive Gold, attempts to define the 
aesthetic functionality standard in the wake of Qualitex and TrafFix,262 
making an effort to reconcile the dicta of those decisions with its own 
aesthetic functionality jurisprudence. 
The court begins its discussion of the aesthetic functionality doctrine by 
anchoring itself against the broad identification and small quantum of the 
infamous Pagliero approach:263 though noting that the Second Circuit has 
“long accepted the doctrine of aesthetic functionality,” the court explicitly 
notes its rejection of the Pagliero formulation, deriding it as “circular” and 
describing it as a penalty.264  The court then presents its alternative designs 
 258.  Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 219 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 
850 n.10 (1982)). 
 259.  See id. at 220 (“[I]f a design feature would, from a traditional utilitarian perspective, be 
considered ‘essential to the use or purpose’ of the article, or to affect its cost or quality, then the 
design feature is functional under Inwood and our inquiry ends.  But if the design feature is 
‘functional’ from a traditional perspective, it must still pass the fact-intensive Qualitex test and be 
shown not to have a significant effect on competition in order to receive trademark protection.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 260.  Id. at 220. 
 261.  See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text. 
 262.  See Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 220–22. 
 263.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 264.  See Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 220. 
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test,265 before turning to a discussion of the impact of Supreme Court 
precedent.266  As did the Ninth Circuit in Au-Tomotive Gold, the Second 
Circuit quotes from both Qualitex and TrafFix, identifying the Supreme 
Court’s “significant, non-reputation-related” test.267  However, in attempting 
to reconcile the Supreme Court dicta with its own jurisprudence, the Second 
Circuit simultaneously corrects the lower court’s oversight in dispensing 
with a discussion of Second Circuit precedent268 and compounds that court’s 
error by casting the significance determination in the language of its own 
circuit—thus diminishing the emphasis on the non-reputation-related nature 
of the significance standard.269  By concluding that “it is clear that the 
combined effect of Qualitex and TrafFix was to validate the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine as it had already been developed by this Court,” the 
Second Circuit imbues the Supreme Court standard with its own “available 
alternative designs” language.270  In this way, the court frames the aesthetic 
functionality test as an inquiry into the availability of alternative designs, 
moving the focus away from the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the 
reputational quality of the features.271  Though in its definition of the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine the Second Circuit properly focuses on the 
protection of competition and shows respect for the heightened scrutiny 
implied by the Supreme Court’s “significance” language, it ultimately 
interprets the significance standard in terms of the availability of alternative 
designs, paving the way for future applications of the doctrine to side-step a 
reputation-related analysis in the same way as the lower court.272 
 265.  See id. at 221 (noting that the Second Circuit does not extend trademark protection “to 
configurations of ornamental features which would significantly limit the range of competitive 
designs available,” and that “the doctrine of aesthetic functionality bars protection of a mark that is 
‘necessary to compete in the [relevant] market’” (alteration in original) (quoting Villeroy & 
Boch Keramische Werke K.G. v. THC Sys., Inc., 999 F.2d 619, 622 (2d Cir.1993))); see also supra 
Part II.B.2. 
 266.  See Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 221–22. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 269.  See Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 221–22. 
 270.  Id. at 221–22. 
 271.  This appears similar to the sort of reconciliation performed by the Ninth Circuit in Au-
Tomotive Gold, see supra Part III.B, resulting in further confusion of the issue, as there are now two 
circuits purporting to implement the same Supreme Court test in differing ways. 
 272.  Though the court pays lip service to the difficulty of distinguishing between reputation-
related disadvantages and other competitive disadvantages, it ultimately focuses on the question of 
competitive need as measured by the availability of alternative designs.  See Louboutin II, 696 F.3d 
at 222 (“Because aesthetic function and branding success can sometimes be difficult to distinguish, 
the aesthetic functionality analysis is highly fact-specific. . . .  In sum, courts must avoid jumping to 
the conclusion that an aesthetic feature is functional merely because it denotes the product’s 
desirable source.”).  This is problematic because a focus on alternative designs is capable of 
undermining the policy goals of trademark law—specifically, those of preventing consumer 
confusion and protecting investment—if it results in underinclusiveness in a given case.  In other 
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The Louboutin case thus represents the most recent iteration of the 
ambiguity surrounding the aesthetic functionality doctrine.  The Supreme 
Court has yet to clearly address the issue on the merits, and the circuit courts 
are grappling with how to integrate their own aesthetic functionality tests 
with the Supreme Court’s nebulous direction on the issue.273  Against this 
background, the Second Circuit’s recent treatment of the issue has brought 
the question full circle by allowing for the possibility that the doctrine could 
be applied to create a high fashion industry carve-out from the Qualitex 
decision.274 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The theoretical and practical difficulties with the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine are brought into relief by the Louboutin case because the high 
fashion industry is a unique forum for the application of this somewhat 
nebulous legal doctrine.275  In other words, the conceptual ambiguity within 
the doctrine itself manifests as practical uncertainty in Louboutin because of 
the nature of the industry at issue: in the world of high fashion, the aesthetic 
functionality inquiry must become very nuanced—and it is thusly that this 
particular case provides an entry into a discussion about what might be done 
to resolve some of the current difficulties with the doctrine.  After explaining 
in more detail the particular problem of the fashion industry, this section 
uses the facts of the Louboutin case to present two varying formulations of 
the aesthetic functionality doctrine, both of which represent plausible 
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent.276  It then discusses the 
words, where a reputation-related inquiry might allow for the trademarking of a feature even where 
there were not available alternative designs because the producer’s advantage in the feature was 
entirely reputation-related in nature, a focus on alternative designs would not serve the purpose of 
the Qualitex “non-reputation-related” inquiry.  The bias inherent in this casting of aesthetic 
functionality is indeed revealed by the Second Circuit’s opinion itself, which goes on to explicate its 
holding against a per se functionality rule by noting that “the functionality defense does not 
guarantee a competitor ‘the greatest range for [his] creative outlet,’ but only the ability to fairly 
compete within a given market.”  See id. at 223 (alteration in original) (quoting Christian Louboutin 
S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).  Such a 
description reveals that the Second Circuit’s aesthetic functionality test, as applied, would tend to 
skew away from functionality as long as there is competitive breathing room in the marketplace, 
failing to account for the nature of the factors (whether reputation-related or non-reputation-related) 
underlying such breathing room. 
 273.  See supra Parts III.A–B; see also supra notes 250–54 and accompanying text. 
 274.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 275.  See supra note 219–20 and accompanying text. 
 276.  See infra Parts IV.A–B. 
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difficulty with each interpretation, particularly the way in which each 
formulation would reflect upon the holding of Qualitex.277  Finally, it 
proposes a solution that would represent the ideal way to resolve the 
problem of aesthetic functionality in the fashion industry while taking into 
account the broader legal and policy considerations at the heart of the 
issue.278 
A.  The Problem of the Fashion Industry 
The holding of the district court in Louboutin—wherein the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine was found to disqualify the use of a single color as a 
design feature—is, to a large extent, a product of the unique characteristics 
of the fashion industry.  Because the Qualitex standard measures 
functionality with reference to the market impact in the industry at issue, 
aesthetic functionality presents a much stronger bar to colormarking in high 
fashion than elsewhere.279  Since the high fashion industry is entirely 
aesthetic in nature, its animating purpose being the enhancement of beauty, 
color is more likely to evade trademark protection there than elsewhere—for 
the simple reason that it is ornamental in character.280  In other words, 
allowing colormarking in fashion threatens to deprive designers of the basic 
elements of their craft.281  Because color is central to the aim of 
ornamentation and visually pleasing ornamentation is the key to success in 
the fashion industry, there is almost always going to be a competitive need 
for color in the fashion industry.282  This can be seen from an examination of 
other cases wherein courts have applied the doctrine with less difficulty. 
For example, in Qualitex itself, the product at issue was green-gold dry 
cleaning pads used on dry cleaning presses.283  There, the Court specifically 
noted that the use of any one particular color on the cleaning pads was not 
necessary for effective competition in the industry; because the primary 
function of the coloration of the cleaning pads was to “avoid noticeable 
stains,” and “other colors [were] equally useable” to achieve the same 
purpose, there was “no competitive need in the press pad industry for the 
green-gold color.”284  Similarly, in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 
 277.  See infra Parts IV.A–B. 
 278.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 279.  See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995). 
 280.  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 281.  See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
 282.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 451. 
 283.  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 161. 
 284.  Id. at 166. 
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the product at issue was pink fiberglass insulation.285  In that case, the 
Federal Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning to conclude that there 
was no “competitive need” for the color pink in the insulation industry 
because the color bore “no relationship to [the] production of fibrous glass 
insulation.”286 
Of course, there may sometimes be a competitive need for color in 
other, non-fashion industries.  However, the need in other such industries 
has proven to be both more articulable and more grounded in clearly 
identifiable consumer tastes.  For instance, in Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, 
Inc., the court found that the color green was functional in the tractor 
industry because farmers wanted to match their loaders and their tractors—
and, thus, allowing the John Deere Company to colormark “John Deere 
green” as applied to front end loaders would deprive competitors of the use 
of a design feature that was necessary to maintaining a presence in the 
industry.287  In another case, Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., the 
court found a competitive need for the color black in the outboard marine 
engine industry because the color, as applied to the engines, both (1) 
rendered the engines compatible with many different boat colors and (2) 
made them appear smaller.288  The Federal Circuit in Brunswick 
distinguished Owens by noting that the lower court had explicitly found 
these two non-trademark functions to be “important to consumers.”289  
Though aesthetic functionality applied to disqualify color from trademark 
protection in the latter two cases, the functions observed were clearly 
articulable and grounded in consumer desire.  In other words, the 
competitive need aspect of the aesthetic functionality determination was 
grounded in quantifiable data about market consumption.290  It would be 
difficult to argue, in either case, that the consumptive appeal was generated 
by the industry itself: engines appearing smaller and the matching of the 
color of one’s loader and tractor represent independent aesthetic concerns 
that originate outside of the market and drive it. 
 285.  774 F.2d 1116, 1118 (Fed. Cir 1985). 
 286.  Id. at 1123. 
 287.  560 F. Supp. 85, 91–92 (S.D. Iowa 1982).  In this case, there was some ambiguity as to 
whether or not the color might have been desirable because it was associated with John Deere as a 
source: the findings of fact noted that most farmers who wanted their loaders repainted requested the 
color “John Deere green.”  See id. 
 288.  35 F.3d 1527, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 289.  Id. at 1532. 
 290.  See id. 
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But with high fashion, there is no such clear demarcation: the specific 
consumer desire is often generated from within the market itself.291  Buyers 
want a certain look because that look is presently “in fashion,” and thus 
consumer preferences are inextricably tied to the looks produced by high 
fashion designers in the first place.292  This means that where fashion is 
concerned, the competitive need is framed not so much as an issue of 
consumer desire as one of designer empowerment.293  Indeed, that is exactly 
how the district court in Louboutin described it: the court premised its 
determination of competitive need for the use of lacquered red soles on 
shoes in the high fashion industry on designers’ abilities to achieve their 
“stylistic goals.”294  This reality gives way to another aesthetic functionality 
problem peculiar to the industry: because the world of haute couture is 
driven by trend-setting, style-making, and branding, the consumer desire for 
specific design features is much more difficult to divorce from the reputation 
of the designer than is the case in other industries.  As a result, the TrafFix 
inquiry into “significant non-reputation-related disadvantages” is a 
complicated one when it comes to fashion.295 
Thus, Louboutin demonstrates that the peculiar problems of aesthetic 
functionality in the high fashion industry are twofold.  First, because the 
aesthetic functionality determination is made with reference to the 
competitive nature of the industry at issue, high fashion is animated by 
creativity, and color can serve innumerable creative ends, the quantum of 
functionality required for color as a design feature in high fashion is 
 291.  The district court in Louboutin, may, however, have unwittingly (or not so unwittingly) 
analogized to such cases by noting that one of the “stylistic goals” of fashion designers might be to 
match shoes to outfits.  See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 
2d 445, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 292.  See Blakley, supra note 61. 
 293.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 451–52.  The Louboutin court painted this picture of the 
issue: 
Suppose that Monet, having just painted his water lilies, encounters a legal challenge 
from Picasso, who seeks by injunction to bar display or sale of those works.  In his 
complaint, Picasso alleges that Monet, in depicting the color of water, used a distinctive 
indigo that Picasso claims was the same or too close to the exquisite shade that Picasso 
declares is “the color of melancholy,” the hallmark of his Blue Period, and is the one 
Picasso applied in his images of water in paintings of that collection . . . .  Should a court 
grant Picasso relief? 
. . . . 
. . . . 
 [No, because the] creative energies of painter and fashion designer are devoted to 
appeal to the same sense in the beholder and wearer: aesthetics . . . . 
 These creative means . . . share a dependence on color as an indispensable medium. 
Id. 
 294.  See id. at 454. 
 295.  See supra Part III.A. 
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extremely low.296  This difficulty militates against colormarking in the 
fashion industry—and perhaps suggests that despite the Second Circuit’s 
opinion, under a proper application of Supreme Court precedent there 
actually should be a carve-out to the Qualitex decision for fashion.297  
Second, because creativity is difficult to divorce from commercial success in 
the high fashion industry—and demand is simultaneously difficult to divorce 
from reputation—the nature of competitive disadvantage is difficult to 
quantify.298  This complexity points in the opposite direction, suggesting that 
an overzealous application of aesthetic functionality in high fashion could 
swallow secondary meaning and undermine the policy goals of trademark 
law.299  Each problem reflects a plausible interpretation of the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine that would find some support in Supreme Court 
precedent and policy considerations.300 
B.  Two Formulations of Aesthetic Functionality as Applied to the Fashion 
Industry 
The Louboutin case illustrates two varying formulations of aesthetic 
functionality, each of which could be supported by a plausible interpretation 
of precedent.301  On the one hand, there is the formulation adopted by the 
district court in Louboutin,302 which allows for disqualification from 
trademark protection with a very small quantum of functionality.303  On the 
other hand, there is an alternative application that focuses on the nature of 
any competitive advantage, requiring that it be clearly non-reputation-
related.  After an introduction and articulation of each formulation, the 
particular facts of the Louboutin case provide context regarding the 
discrepancies with each.304 
 296.  See supra notes 281–97 and accompanying text. 
 297.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 298.  See infra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 299.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 300.  See supra Part III.A. 
 301.  See infra Parts IV.B.1–2. 
 302.  Though the Second Circuit ultimately reversed the judge’s holding suggesting that 
Louboutin’s mark should be invalidated on the grounds of aesthetic functionality, the circuit’s 
opinion did not effectively cabin the application of this formulation of aesthetic functionality, 
because the circuit court did not reach the functionality issue.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 303.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 304.  By this, I mean to say that each formulation will sometimes generate subpar outcomes.  The 
use of the Louboutin facts reveals how this might be so under the specific circumstances of that case.  
See infra Parts IV.B.1–2. 
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1.  Louboutin vs. YSL I: Small Quantum Amounting to a Carve-Out—
Proper Application of Qualitex or Contradiction? 
The Louboutin formulation of aesthetic functionality interprets the 
doctrine so broadly as to amount to a carve-out from the Qualitex 
colormarking decision.  As one commentator put it, the Louboutin ruling 
“carve[d] out what was essentially a special exception for fashion, taking the 
position that single colors are always functional in fashion because they are 
a basic design element that all labels need to have access to in order to 
compete in the marketplace.”305  The principles of this formulation, then, are 
threefold: it requires an extremely small quantum of functionality,306 it 
examines competitive need through the lens of supply-side rather than 
demand-side deprivation,307 and it tends to bias toward insulating 
competition by short-circuiting the significant-non-reputation-related 
disadvantage analysis.308  A deconstruction of the Louboutin decision takes 
each point in turn. 
a.  Quantums Are Sexy 
The district court opinion in Louboutin related the history of Christian 
Louboutin’s red sole design feature thusly: 
Sometime around 1992 designer Christian Louboutin had a bright 
idea.  He began coloring glossy vivid red the outsoles of his high 
fashion women’s shoes.  Whether inspired by a stroke of original 
genius or . . . Dorothy’s famous ruby slippers in “The Wizard of 
Oz” . . . Louboutin deviated from industry custom.  In his own 
words, this diversion was meant to give his line of shoes “energy,” a 
purpose for which he chose a shade of red because he regarded it as 
‘engaging, flirtatious, memorable and the color of passion,’ as well 
as “sexy.”309 
 305.  Charles Colman, Everything You Need to Understand the Louboutin v. YSL Lawsuit, 
STYLEITE (Aug. 12, 2011, 3:51 PM), http://www.styleite.com/media/louboutin-lawsuit-explanation/.  
Though the Second Circuit, in deciding the Louboutin appeal, struck down any sort of per se rule 
against a single color serving as a trademark in the fashion industry, it did not prevent the application 
of the formulation of the functionality doctrine proposed in the district court’s opinion—and, as 
such, arguably left open the door to a functional carve-out with an effect similar to that of a per se 
rule.  See supra Part III.C.2; see also infra Parts IV.B.1.a–c. 
 306.  See infra Part IV.B.1.a. 
 307.  See infra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 308.  See infra Part IV.B.1.c. 
 309.  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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In applying the aesthetic functionality doctrine, the district court then 
zeroed in on these creative decisions in identifying the functions performed 
by the sole: it cited as non-trademark functions the ability of the red soles to 
give the shoes “energy” and imbue them with a certain sexiness and 
appeal.310  In other words, the fact that the red soles comprised a specific 
“look” that had potential to be aesthetically appealing on some 
unquantifiable level proved enough to disqualify them from trademark 
protection.311  Indeed, the court described these aesthetic possibilities as 
“significant, nontrademark functions.”312  In reality, such functions hardly 
seem extant—let alone significant.  For one, the fact that adding a dash of 
red might make a piece of clothing appear “sexy,” and, because of this, 
aesthetically and commercially appealing to some consumers, is an 
extremely low threshold of functionality.  Such a notion does not even come 
close to the sort of functionality seen in other industries.  The ability of the 
color black to make a motor appear smaller, for instance, is at least a 
quantifiable aesthetic function—but the fact that red may make a design 
sexy and appealing is more a matter of subjective taste than anything else.313  
Additionally, that red even performs this function is almost a matter of 
assumption: the district judge in Louboutin begins his analysis from the 
premise that “color . . . plays a unique role” in the context of the high 
fashion industry and goes on to suggest that because this industry is 
primarily concerned with aesthetics and ornamentation, the use of color 
therein must “aim[] to please or be useful, not . . . identify and advertise a 
commercial source.”314  Because the district court in Louboutin began with 
this assumption—that color served artistic, and not source-identifying, 
purposes—it was able to find that the artistic ends (i.e., creating a “sexy” or 
“energetic” look) served by the application of the color constituted functions 
disqualifying its use from trademark protection in the industry.315  This 
quantum of functionality is both low and nebulous.  Moreover, the 
assumptions underlying it are at least suspect, if not entirely faulty, as 
market research indicates that the red sole identifies the shoes as emanating 
 310.  See id. at 453. 
 311.  See id. 
 312.  Id. 
 313.  See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
 314.  Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 452. 
 315.  See id. 
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from Louboutin—suggesting that, in reality, this might actually be the soles’ 
primary function for consumers.316 
b.  Supply-Side Need 
In addition to requiring a small quantum of functionality, the Louboutin 
formulation of aesthetic functionality also examines competitive need 
through the lens of supply-side rather than demand-side requirements.317  
Under this sort of analysis, the court examines not whether the market for a 
certain product dictates access to the use of a feature in order to compete; 
rather, it inquires into whether the producers of a certain product require 
access to that feature to achieve their goals.318  The distinction lies in the 
difficulty with divorcing supply and demand in the high fashion industry—
in high fashion, the demand is often generated by the designers 
themselves.319  The Louboutin formulation thus focuses on the need for 
designers to have access to all colors as elements of their craft.320  
Comparing high fashion to painting, the district court in Louboutin notes that 
the goals of fashion design are both creativity and commerce, and that “[t]he 
creative energies of painter and fashion designer are devoted to appeal to the 
same sense in the beholder and wearer: aesthetics.”321  It then concludes that 
color cannot qualify for trademark protection in the fashion industry because 
allowing this would rob designers of the full palate necessary to effective 
creativity—and, insofar as commercial success in the industry is grounded in 
creativity, to effective competition.322  The court thus holds that the use of a 
single color as a design feature should never qualify for trademark protection 
in fashion, citing the “broad spectrum of absurdities that would follow 
 316.  See Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 5, Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 2381), 2011 WL 2972936 (citing a survey which found that 47% of 
those surveyed thought a shoe with a red sole was a Louboutin and that 96% of those who made the 
mistake said that they did so because of the association between Louboutin and the red sole).  The 
alternative interpretation, then, is that the consumers find the shoes attractive because they are 
Louboutins and seek out the red sole not because it is attractive in and of itself but because its 
association with a strong brand and a successful tastemaker render it a desireable item.  Under this 
formulation, any aesthetic “sexiness” inherent in the application of the color red is certainly 
secondary to the color’s ability to identify the product as emanating from a particularly desirable 
source.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 317.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
 318.  See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
 319.  See Blakley, supra note 61. 
 320.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
 321.  See id. at 452. 
 322.  See id. at 452–53 (“[In both painting and fashion design,] the greatest range for creative 
outlet exists with its highest, most vibrant and all encompassing energies where every pigment of the 
spectrum is freely available for the creator to apply, where every painter and designer in producing 
artful works enjoys equal freedom to pick and choose color from every streak of the rainbow.”). 
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recognition of a trademark for the use of a single color for fashion items.”323  
In this way, the small quantum aspect of the Louboutin aesthetic 
functionality formulation contributes to a supply-side orientation which 
leads to an application that amounts to a Qualitex carve-out for the high 
fashion industry.324  When the focus is on the designers rather than the 
consumers, and when it is recognized that color is essential to aesthetic 
expression, the specter of creative constriction looms large enough that the 
granting of trademark seems an unsound idea.325 
c.  Short-Circuiting Reputation 
Finally, the Louboutin formulation, in allowing for a small quantum of 
functionality and focusing on the supply-side in its examination of 
competitive need, tends to short-circuit the non-reputation-related significant 
disadvantage analysis from TrafFix by failing to adequately account for 
reputation-related benefits.326  In Louboutin, the district court asks whether 
the existence of the Red Sole Mark would “significantly hinder competition” 
by “permit[ting] one competitor . . . to interfere with legitimate (non-
trademark-related) competition through . . . exclusive use of an important 
product ingredient.”327  The court then concludes that the Red Sole Mark 
threatens “legitimate competition in the designer shoe market,”328 without 
providing any analysis into whether such a threat is non-reputation-related.  
Instead, the court seems to assume that the threat to competition is 
significant because the existence of the Red Sole Mark prevents other 
designers from using red outsoles to achieve various “stylistic goals” like 
“referenc[ing] traditional Chinese lacquer ware, [creating] a monochromatic 
shoe, [or creating] a cohesive look consisting of color-coordinating shoes 
and garments.”329  Thus, though it does at least give some consideration to 
the question of the significance of the threat—the meaning of the word 
“significant” being moderated to reflect the miniscule quantum of 
functionality allowed for by this formulation of the doctrine—the court 
never examines whether and to what extent any disadvantage might be 
 323.  Id. at 457. 
 324.  See supra note 305. 
 325.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 457. 
 326.  See supra Part III.A. 
 327.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 
U.S. 159, 170 (1995)). 
 328.  Id. 
 329.  Id. 
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reputation-related.330  This failure probably derives from a bias that seems 
inherent in the test: seeking to protect competition and beginning from the 
premise that high fashion design, like art, is grounded in creative expression, 
this formulation tends to examine significance with an eye toward the 
industry at issue, which requires the use of color as a basic element.331 
The Louboutin aesthetic functionality formulation represents a plausible 
interpretation of Qualitex.332  Qualitex allowed for the determination of 
functionality to be made with reference to the industry,333 suggested that the 
ultimate question in application of the doctrine was one of competitive 
hindrance,334 and established a policy animation of erring on the side of 
disallowing trademark protection where fair competition might suffer.335  
This formulation, however, fails to account for the TrafFix modification of 
the doctrine—a modification that is particularly relevant in the fashion 
industry, where reputation-related benefits abound.336 
2.  TrafFix and Au-Tomotive Gold: Reputation-Related Benefits as an 
Alternative Formulation 
There is an alternative formulation of the aesthetic functionality doctrine 
that is supported by both Supreme Court precedent from TrafFix as well as 
the Ninth Circuit “wholly independent” lines of cases.337  This approach 
recognizes the reality that in the fashion industry it is often difficult to 
divorce a certain design feature’s appeal from the designer associated with 
it: because success in the high-fashion industry often trades on the cache of a 
famous name or brand, it can be nearly impossible to determine whether a 
design feature appealed to consumers independent of the designer with 
whom the feature was associated.338  This formulation’s defining 
characteristics are an emphasis on secondary meaning,339 a larger quantum of 
functionality whereby design features will not be disqualified from 
trademark protection unless they can be shown to perform a function 
 330.  See supra note 316. 
 331.  See supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 332.  See supra Parts II.A, III.A. 
 333.  See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
 334.  See id. at 165. 
 335.  See id. at 168–69. 
 336.  See supra Part III.A. 
 337.  See supra Parts II.B.1, III.A. 
 338.  See Blakley, supra note 61.  This reality is something to which the Second Circuit only paid 
lip service in the Louboutin appeal.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 339.  See infra Part IV.B.2.a. 
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separate from source-identification,340 and an emphasis on the non-
reputation-related aspect of the doctrine.341 
a.  Secondary Meaning 
As already noted, secondary meaning must exist in order for any design 
that is not inherently distinctive to qualify for trademark protection.342  
Under Qualitex, features using a single color alone must both have acquired 
secondary meaning and be shown to be nonfunctional.343  In Louboutin, the 
district court explicitly concedes that Louboutin has established secondary 
meaning in the Red Sole.344  However, because the court finds the feature to 
be functional—indeed, finds that color as a feature will always be functional 
in the high fashion industry context—it does not consider the facts providing 
support for secondary meaning in any reputation-related context.345  In other 
words, the Louboutin formulation fails to take account of the significance of 
reputation in generating consumer appeal.  The alternative formulation does 
just that; it begins from the premise that where design features have acquired 
secondary meaning, it is difficult to prove that any aesthetic appeal they 
possess is non-reputation-related in nature.  This notion is illustrated by the 
Ninth Circuit’s Au-Tomotive Gold decision: there, actual brand marks like 
the Audi logo of four interlocking rings were claimed to be functional 
because of “[a]n aesthetic quality to the marks that purchasers are interested 
in having.”346  The circuit court applied TrafFix’s “significant non-
reputation-related benefit” test,347 combined with its own “wholly 
independent”348 aesthetic functionality test, to determine that “the alleged 
aesthetic function is indistinguishable from and tied to the mark’s source-
identifying nature.”349  The implication is clear: where any design feature has 
acquired strong secondary meaning, it becomes much more difficult to 
divine the appeal that is generated independent of reputation.  This is 
 340.  See infra Part IV.B.2.b. 
 341.  See infra Part IV.B.2.c. 
 342.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 343.  See supra Part II.A. 
 344.  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).  The Second Circuit 
upheld this finding. 
 345.  See id. at 456–58. 
 346.  Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 347.  Id. at 1072. 
 348.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 349.  See Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1073–74. 
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particularly true in the fashion industry, where few design features acquire 
secondary meaning because fast-fashion knockoff giants such as Forever 21 
copy features before they ever get a chance to build up source-identification 
in the marketplace.350  Thus, the alternative formulation of aesthetic 
functionality recognizes that where secondary meaning has been acquired, a 
larger quantum of functionality should be required in order to demonstrate 
that such functionality exists independently of reputational appeal.351 
In so doing, this formulation borrows heavily from the Ninth Circuit 
wholly independent test, which measures functionality by the ability of the 
feature to perform some function completely apart from reputational 
appeal.352 
b.  Independence 
The Louboutin case did not truly apply either of the prevailing measures 
of aesthetic functionality as currently defined by the federal circuit courts.353  
Instead, the district court simply inquired into whether the red sole 
performed any significant nontrademark functions.354  Determining that it 
did,355 and, in the alternative, that the sole also affected the cost or quality of 
the shoe,356 the court went on to address competitive need without examining 
reputational benefit.357  The alternative formulation would have the court act 
differently; it would have the court adopt some variation of the “wholly 
independent” test as the initial measure of functionality.358  Thus, once a 
court decides that a design feature has acquired secondary meaning, it 
should ask if the feature performs a function completely independent of 
source-identification.  If it does, the court should go on to examine whether 
or not this function confers significant non-reputation-related benefits under 
TrafFix.359  Such a formulation would not only be plausible under Qualitex 
 350.  See L. J. Jackson, Some Designers Say Their Work Deserves Copyright Protection; Others 
Say it Would Harm the Industry, ABA JOURNAL (July 1, 2011, 3:30 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_genuine_article/. 
 351.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 352.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 353.  See supra Part II.B.  This is odd, considering it was decided in the Second Circuit and 
probably should have applied—or at least mentioned—the alternative designs measure.  See supra 
Part II.B.2. 
 354.  See supra notes 322–33 and accompanying text. 
 355.  See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454–55 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 356.  See id. 
 357.  See id. at 456–58. 
 358.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 359.  See supra Part III.A. 
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and TrafFix,360 it would also serve the policy goal of preventing consumer 
confusion.361 
c.  Emphasizing Non-Reputation-Related Benefits 
Because the alternative formulation of the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine is oriented toward recognition of the brand-driven nature of the high 
fashion industry, it emphasizes the additional threshold added by the 
Supreme Court in TrafFix.362  Not only does this formulation require 
evidence of a wholly independent function at the stage wherein the court is 
determining whether a feature qualifies as functional in the first place, it also 
requires that the degree of functionality be such that the exclusive use of the 
feature would put competitors at a significant disadvantage that is 
sufficiently divorced from any relationship to reputation.363  Under such a 
formulation, the district court in the Louboutin case would not have been 
able to rest its decision on deprivation of the color red from designers’ 
creative palates under a theory of supply-side competitive need.364  Instead of 
simply determining that Louboutin’s Red Sole Mark would significantly 
hinder competition by prohibiting other designers from achieving the 
“stylistic goals” that might be necessary to compete in any given fashion 
season,365 the court would have examined the extent to which the demand for 
the design feature at issue was generated by Louboutin in the first place.  In 
the context of the particular facts of the Louboutin case, this examination 
would have produced questions about whether or not the inability to (1) 
reference traditional Chinese lacquer ware, (2) create a monochromatic shoe, 
or (3) create a cohesive look consisting of color-coordinated shoes and 
garments366 actually qualified as a significant disadvantage.367  It would also 
have forced the court to inquire as to whether the demand for the particular 
design feature at issue was reputation-related.  Had the court adopted and 
 360.  See supra Part III.A. 
 361.  See Cohen, supra note 49, at 637 (mentioning the trademark goal of preventing consumer 
confusion in the context of TrafFix, a case wherein the Court, according to Cohen, “revived the view 
that the freedom to copy unpatented product designs trumped the concern regarding the risk of 
public confusion”). 
 362.  See supra Part III.A. 
 363.  See supra Part III.A. 
 364.  See supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 365.  See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 366.  See id. 
 367.  See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001). 
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undertaken to apply this formulation in the Louboutin case, the outcome may 
have been substantially different: if the inability to create a cohesive, color-
coordinated look does indeed put competitors at a significant disadvantage, 
it might not be difficult to conclude that the Red Sole mark qualifies as 
functional because there is little objective evidence that the demand for 
monochromatic looks was generated by Louboutin or is related in any way 
to his reputation as a designer.  If, however, the inability to use a Red Sole to 
evoke Chinese lacquer ware put competitors at a significant disadvantage, 
the Red Sole mark might fail this formulation of the aesthetic functionality 
test where it could be demonstrated that the demand for the Chinese lacquer 
ware look was generated by Louboutin and was strongly associated with his 
reputation as a designer.368  Thus, the alternative aesthetic functionality 
formulation may allow design features—even those using color alone—to 
more readily qualify for trademark protection where they have a strong, 
demonstrated connection to reputation.  This formulation is supported by the 
TrafFix modification of Qualitex and by the policy goal of preventing 
consumer confusion.369  Under it, the internal conceptual integrity of the 
aesthetic functionality doctrine does not require a Qualitex carve-out for the 
high-fashion industry.370  Having determined that there exist two plausible 
formulations of the doctrine, the contours of the best formulation—the 
formulation that the federal circuits should apply in the future—remain to be 
discerned. 
C.  Problems and Proposed Solutions: A Strengthened Significance 
Standard Avoids the Qualitex Carve-Out and Maintains a Meaningful 
Distinction Between Secondary Meaning and Aesthetic Functionality 
The Louboutin formulation—the small quantum amounting to a carve-
out—is both plausible and, as clearly demonstrated by the Second Circuit’s 
review, problematic.371  In the first place, it is plausible because it is biased 
toward protecting fair competition, a policy goal explicitly recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Qualitex as the ultimate animating purpose of the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine.372  In other words, if the district court in Louboutin is 
correct to suggest that color, as a basic design element, will always be 
necessary for effective competition in the high-fashion industry, a broad 
application of aesthetic functionality capable of amounting to an effective 
 368.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
 369.  See supra Part III.A. 
 370.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 371.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 372.  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995). 
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carve-out seems, at least from a policy perspective, to be the right one.373  
However, this formulation is also problematic: the carve-out impliedly 
created by the reasoning in Louboutin is conceptually difficult because it 
goes against the Qualitex ruling, essentially letting the doctrine of aesthetic 
functionality stand in for the former, traditional principle that colors alone 
cannot be trademarked—a potential outcome recognized and explicitly 
struck down by the Second Circuit on appeal.374  The difficulties with this 
formulation are clear from the district court’s opinion in Louboutin, which 
cites as support the same legal arguments marshaled in favor of the per se 
rule against colormarking before Qualitex—color depletion and shade 
confusion.375  Because the Court already rejected these arguments in 
Qualitex, any use of this formulation of aesthetic functionality to create a 
carve-out for the fashion industry generates an undesirable precedential 
circularity: though Qualitex positioned the aesthetic functionality doctrine as 
a gatekeeper preventing the improper trademarking of color, the Louboutin 
formulation makes it into a total bar, essentially presenting the question of 
colormarking anew under a different guise.376  In essence, the Louboutin 
formulation requires the Court to choose between colormarking and 
aesthetic functionality—at least where high fashion is concerned, this 
interpretation of the law will not allow for both.  Because the Louboutin 
aesthetic formulation generates this sort of outcome, it is subpar.  Higher 
courts taking up the issue have recognized as much, but have failed to 
articulate a better formulation.  Such a preferable formulation would allow 
aesthetic functionality to operate in the high fashion industry without 
undermining the Qualitex holding. 
The proposed solution to the problem of the fashion industry integrates 
aspects of both aesthetic functionality formulations to arrive at a solution 
that serves the important trademark goals of protecting fair competition 
 373.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 374.  See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text. 
 375.  See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 455. 
[T]his impediment would apply not just with respect to Louboutin’s registered ‘the color 
red,’ but, on its theory as pressed in this litigation, to a broader band of various other 
shades of red which would be available to Louboutin but which it could bar others from 
using. . . . [and a] competitor examining the Louboutin registration drawing for guidance 
as to what color it applies to may therefore remain unable to determine precisely which 
shade or shades it encompasses and which others are available for it to safely use. 
Id. 
 376.  The question that the Court really needs to address is the aesthetic functionality one.  See 
supra note 116 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.B. 
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while also preventing consumer confusion.377  The solution has three aspects: 
(1) it allows for a small quantum of functionality, recognizing the 
importance of color as a design element in the fashion industry; (2) it 
emphasizes the “significance” language of both Qualitex and TrafFix, 
strengthening this inquiry as a variable that will allow courts to achieve the 
correct balance between protecting competition and avoiding consumer 
confusion when applying aesthetic functionality; and (3) it requires that the 
benefit conferred by allowing a design feature to be trademarked be non-
reputation-related in nature, a prong of the inquiry with particularly 
important implications for the design industry, wherein so much consumer 
demand is generated by successful reputational branding.378  Under this 
solution, design features like Louboutin’s Red Sole mark would qualify for 
trademark protection, a result that is in line with both Supreme Court 
precedent from Qualitex and the underlying policies of trademark law 
itself.379 
A brief application of this formulation to the facts of Louboutin 
demonstrates how the outcome of the functionality determination at the 
district court level would change.  First, the initial functionality 
determination would remain the same: the ability of the red sole feature to 
imbue a certain sexiness and appeal into the shoes would qualify as 
aesthetically functional.380  However, the red sole would fail to meet the 
strengthened significance standard drawn from TrafFix: the inability of other 
designers to create a coordinated, all-red look by being denied the 
opportunity to color the soles of their shoes red would likely not qualify as a 
significant disadvantage—on balance, this disadvantage is slight compared 
to the potential confusion that could be caused by failing to award Louboutin 
a trademark where his feature has clearly developed strong secondary 
meaning.381  Finally, even if a court determined that this or some other 
function performed by the sole—perhaps its ability to reference a 
“traditional Chinese lacquer ware” look—did pass the significance 
threshold, the mark would still fail to qualify as functional because the 
demand for the red sole as a design feature could not be sufficiently divorced 
from Louboutin’s reputation.382  This final prong of the test ensures that 
those few features which truly have garnered trademarkability—which have 
become so closely associated with a designer and so desirable that it is no 
longer possible to divorce the appeal of the feature from the appeal of the 
 377.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 378.  See Blakley, supra note 61. 
 379.  See supra Part III.A. 
 380.  See supra Part IV.B.1.a. 
 381.  See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447–48 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 382.  See id. 
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designer—will not be disqualified from trademark protection, while other 
features that are merely aesthetically appealing will be made freely available 
for use by all. 
V.  IMPACT 
The legal impact of accepting the first formulation of aesthetic 
functionality would be a Qualitex carve-out for the entire fashion industry—
an outcome already recognized as unacceptable by at least one circuit 
court.383  But the societal impact would be somewhat broader.  Accepting 
this formulation would rob the fashion industry of the only intellectual 
property protection it currently has—trademark.384  Allowing a fashion 
carve-out means that courts will never have to examine “when the use of 
colour on a portion of apparel is a design element and when it is a 
trademark.”385  Instead, any use of color in the high fashion industry—even a 
use that has developed secondary meaning and has clearly become primarily 
source-identifying—would be per se disqualified from trademark protection.  
The danger in this is not so much that designers would stop creating; indeed, 
at least one astute commentator has suggested that the lack of intellectual 
property protection available in the fashion world has actually elevated the 
level of creativity.386  Rather, the danger lies in the erosion that this sort of 
formulation might have on the concept of source-identification itself.387 
To understand how this is so, it is important to recognize a reality that is 
self-evident for the fashionista but elusive for the federal judge—the fact 
that fashion is the realm of the tastemaker.388  Tastemakers are the 
individuals whose aesthetic preferences drive the fashion industry, and they 
exist specifically because the intellectual property protection available to the 
industry has been largely nonexistent throughout history.389  In other words, 
because the basic building blocks of fashion—the actual templates for 
creating articles like dresses, pants, shorts, and accessories—cannot be 
protected, however innovative they may be, designers seeking recognition 
have been driven to create a unique aesthetic—an unusual composition of 
 383.  See supra Parts IV.B.1., III.C.2. 
 384.  See Blakley, supra note 61. 
 385.  See Louboutin v. YSL: Lay Off My Red-Soled Shoes, THE ECONOMIST (August 20, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21526357 (quoting law professor Susan Scafidi). 
 386.  See Blakley, supra note 61. 
 387.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 388.  See Blakley, supra note 61. 
 389.  See id. 
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those elements that can be particularly associated with them.390  As one 
commentator put it, “that’s what fashion designers are doing all the time . . . 
[t]hey’re trying to put together a signature look, an aesthetic, that reflects 
who they are [so that] when people knock it off, everybody knows because 
they’ve put that look out on the runway, and it’s a coherent aesthetic.”391  In 
other words, the current state of the fashion industry actually drives 
designers to create a signature look that is associated with themselves and 
their brand.  And, much success in the industry comes to those who can do 
this well.  This reality illustrates the reason why fashion insiders were so 
shocked by the Louboutin decision: they begin from the exact opposite 
premise of that used by the district court in Louboutin—they believe that the 
red sole is desirable because it’s Louboutin, not because it’s pretty or sexy in 
its own right.392  To much of the public, then, the appeal of the red sole is 
one and the same with the appeal of owning a pair of Louboutins—of being 
associated with his particular brand and its cache.  Thus, denying trademark 
protection to design features like Louboutin’s might result in consumer 
confusion because the actual consumer market for the product treats the 
feature as primarily source-identifying.393  This, in turn, could weaken the 
effectiveness of the concept of secondary meaning as a trademark principle 
that measures consumer behavior and directs the application of trademark 
law toward protecting against such confusion.394 
In Louboutin’s case, the appeal of the red sole is so tied up with his 
appeal as a designer that trademark protection is appropriate.  Of course, this 
is not the case for all design features; some are simply appealing in their 
own right.  But it is important that courts continue to make this 
determination, rather than simply denying any protection to those designers 
who are able to develop a feature into a source-identifying characteristic.395  
Adopting the proposed solution mitigates the risk on both sides of the issue: 
it avoids the potentially negative consequences of disregarding source-
identification in the fashion industry while also allowing for a small 
quantum so that courts can find functionality where features are aesthetically 
appealing and their exclusive use would put competitors at a significant 
disadvantage unrelated to reputation.396 
Applying this formulation of aesthetic functionality would allow 
features like Christian Louboutin’s signature red soles to garner trademark 
 390.  See id. 
 391.  Id. 
 392.  See supra Part III.C. 
 393.  See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 394.  See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 395.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 396.  See supra Part IV.C. 
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protection where they serve primarily to identify a product as emanating 
from a particular source and do not put other designers at a significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage.397  It would maintain the appropriate 
balance between preventing consumer confusion and protecting 
competition.398  In essence, it would please both the fashionistas and the 
federal judges by complying with precedent while also allowing a design 
feature—the red sole—that has clearly risen to the level of a mark to retain 
the market space that it has created.  Under this formulation, future designers 
will be able to rightfully protect the appeal that they have generated by 
pioneering a signature look. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The signature Christian Louboutin red sole is best viewed on a wearer 
who is walking away.  In the same way, the importance of the case dealing 
with this mark is also best understood in hindsight: a study of the Louboutin 
case in the context of the current state of the law on the doctrine of aesthetic 
functionality demonstrates the ways in which the uncertainties surrounding 
the doctrine might be resolved.399  While the opinion of the district court in 
Louboutin represents one plausible formulation of the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine, a close examination of the Supreme Court precedent and circuit 
court treatment of the issue reveals an alternative formulation.400  Under this 
alternative formulation, no carve-out from the important Qualitex holding is 
necessary to insulate the high-fashion industry from any anticompetitive 
consequences of granting trademark to color alone as a design feature.401  
Thus, this alternative formulation represents an appealing resolution of the 
aesthetic functionality problem.  Alas, its appeal probably means that the 
argument herein could never qualify for trademark protection. 
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